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- Publisher
- Brill
- Copyright
- © Copyright 2005 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
- ISSN
- 1572-3429
- eISSN
- 1875-8185
- DOI
- 10.1163/18758185-90000002
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Contemporary Pragmatism Vol. 2, No. 1 (June 2005), 133 Editions Rodopi © 2005 Kai Nielsen This essay offers an account of Rorty's version of pragmatism after the so-called linguistic turn, including his attack on epistemology and metaphysics, his metaphilosophy, his theory of morality, and his political philosophy. Woven into this account of Rorty are some of the most important criticisms made of Rorty, and considerations about how Rorty has responded or could have responded. Richard Rorty is a controversial figure in contemporary philosophy. The very mention of his name in a respectful tone gets some philosophers hot under the collar and from others a prompt dismissal. Others, including some very important others, take him very seriously indeed. Among them some think his views are largely on the mark and importantly creative and innovative (e.g., Donald Davidson and Michael Williams) while others take him equally seriously but think his views are deeply and importantly flawed (e.g., Bernard Williams and Charles Taylor). I am, to show my colors, largely of the Donald Davidson-Michael Williams persuasion. I, like them, think Rorty is one of the most important philosophical figures of our time. While like them I have criticized and recorded my
Journal
Contemporary Pragmatism – Brill
Published: Apr 21, 2005