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Positionality and Consciousness in Husserl’s Ideas I

Positionality and Consciousness in Husserl’s Ideas I In this paper I argue that in Husserl’s Ideas I (1913) there is a seeming contradiction between the characterization of pure consciousness as the residue of the performance of the phenomenological reduction and the claim that in the natural attitude consciousness is taken to be an entity is the world. This creates a puzzle regarding the positional status of consciousness in the natural attitude. After reviewing some possible options to solve this puzzle in the existing literature, I claim that the positional status of conscious experiences in the natural attitude is best characterized as unsettled . The act that settles the positional status of conscious experiences (i.e. our manifold Erlebnisse ) is reflection. In reflection, experiences are posited as beings, either in a psychological or in a phenomenological key. I conclude by arguing that the problem of positing is of paramount importance to understand correctly Husserl’s claim that phenomenology is voraussetzungslos . http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Research in Phenomenology Brill

Positionality and Consciousness in Husserl’s Ideas I

Research in Phenomenology , Volume 46 (2): 277 – May 28, 2016

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
Subject
Topic: The New Husserl
ISSN
0085-5553
eISSN
1569-1640
DOI
10.1163/15691640-12341339
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

In this paper I argue that in Husserl’s Ideas I (1913) there is a seeming contradiction between the characterization of pure consciousness as the residue of the performance of the phenomenological reduction and the claim that in the natural attitude consciousness is taken to be an entity is the world. This creates a puzzle regarding the positional status of consciousness in the natural attitude. After reviewing some possible options to solve this puzzle in the existing literature, I claim that the positional status of conscious experiences in the natural attitude is best characterized as unsettled . The act that settles the positional status of conscious experiences (i.e. our manifold Erlebnisse ) is reflection. In reflection, experiences are posited as beings, either in a psychological or in a phenomenological key. I conclude by arguing that the problem of positing is of paramount importance to understand correctly Husserl’s claim that phenomenology is voraussetzungslos .

Journal

Research in PhenomenologyBrill

Published: May 28, 2016

Keywords: Husserl; consciousness; transcendental phenomenology; reflection; presuppositionlessness

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