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Parmenides’ Problem of Becoming and Its Solution

Parmenides’ Problem of Becoming and Its Solution Parmenides’ Problem of Becoming and Its Solution Erwin Tegtmeier, Universität Mannheim From Plato to the present, the predominant view has been that Parmenides’ problem of becoming arose from a misconception of being and/or knowing. However, I will try to show that the problem is genuine and remains unsolved without a fundamental change in our common notion of becoming. Moreover, I will plead for a return to Parmenides’ strict concept of being which excludes any kind of non-being, of non-existence. Bringing in non-existence is usually implicit and loose, especially with respect to the passage of time. It was Parmenides’ eminent achievement to attend to it and to take it seriously. His successors, Plato and Aristotle, saw no other way than to reject the strict concept of being and to acknowledge some kind of semi-existence. The strict concept is to be distinguished from the marks of being (timelessness, continuity, indivisibility). Parmenides derives them from his main conclusions (the impossibility of becoming, change, and plurality). Unlike the strict concept of being, the marks of being have been undeservedly influential. In Plato, the influence is obvious. But even in the empiricist antipode to the rationalist Parmenides, in Aristotle, it is there despite his http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis Brill

Parmenides’ Problem of Becoming and Its Solution

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
Copyright © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
2666-4283
eISSN
2666-4275
DOI
10.30965/26664275-00201006
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Parmenides’ Problem of Becoming and Its Solution Erwin Tegtmeier, Universität Mannheim From Plato to the present, the predominant view has been that Parmenides’ problem of becoming arose from a misconception of being and/or knowing. However, I will try to show that the problem is genuine and remains unsolved without a fundamental change in our common notion of becoming. Moreover, I will plead for a return to Parmenides’ strict concept of being which excludes any kind of non-being, of non-existence. Bringing in non-existence is usually implicit and loose, especially with respect to the passage of time. It was Parmenides’ eminent achievement to attend to it and to take it seriously. His successors, Plato and Aristotle, saw no other way than to reject the strict concept of being and to acknowledge some kind of semi-existence. The strict concept is to be distinguished from the marks of being (timelessness, continuity, indivisibility). Parmenides derives them from his main conclusions (the impossibility of becoming, change, and plurality). Unlike the strict concept of being, the marks of being have been undeservedly influential. In Plato, the influence is obvious. But even in the empiricist antipode to the rationalist Parmenides, in Aristotle, it is there despite his

Journal

History of Philosophy and Logical AnalysisBrill

Published: Apr 5, 1999

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