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Ockham on the (In)fallibility of Intuitive Cognition

Ockham on the (In)fallibility of Intuitive Cognition The main purpose of this paper is to reassess the debate between Boehner and Karger about Ockham’s views on the infallibility of intuitive cognition, and to present a new account of infallible intuitive cognition. After a detailed overview of Ockham’s theory of intuitive and abstractive cognition, the Boehner/Karger debate is examined. At the center of this debate are two conflicting interpretations of a certain passage in Ockham’s writings. It is shown that neither of these interpretations is ultimately successful. Next, a third interpretation is introduced and shown to be superior to the previous two. This new interpretation leads to a refutation of one of Karger’s main arguments against Boehner’s theory of the infallibility of intuitive cognition. Finally, a distinction between weak and strong infallibility is introduced (based on whether the intuitive cognition causes a false judgment, or merely co-occurs with it), and it is argued that intuitive cognition is always weakly infallible, and often (but not always) also strongly infallible. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis Brill

Ockham on the (In)fallibility of Intuitive Cognition

History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis , Volume 17 (1): 17 – Apr 5, 2014

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
Copyright © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
2666-4283
eISSN
2666-4275
DOI
10.30965/26664275-01701009
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

The main purpose of this paper is to reassess the debate between Boehner and Karger about Ockham’s views on the infallibility of intuitive cognition, and to present a new account of infallible intuitive cognition. After a detailed overview of Ockham’s theory of intuitive and abstractive cognition, the Boehner/Karger debate is examined. At the center of this debate are two conflicting interpretations of a certain passage in Ockham’s writings. It is shown that neither of these interpretations is ultimately successful. Next, a third interpretation is introduced and shown to be superior to the previous two. This new interpretation leads to a refutation of one of Karger’s main arguments against Boehner’s theory of the infallibility of intuitive cognition. Finally, a distinction between weak and strong infallibility is introduced (based on whether the intuitive cognition causes a false judgment, or merely co-occurs with it), and it is argued that intuitive cognition is always weakly infallible, and often (but not always) also strongly infallible.

Journal

History of Philosophy and Logical AnalysisBrill

Published: Apr 5, 2014

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