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Nominalism and the Disappearance of the Problem of Individuation

Nominalism and the Disappearance of the Problem of Individuation Nominalism and the Disappearance of the Problem of Individuation Eric M. Rubenstein, Indiana University of Pennsylvania While the Medievals spilled much ink over the Problem of Individuation, the Moderns scarcely mention it. For instance, while Descartes ignores the problem entirely, Locke has only the following to say. From what has been said, ’tis easy to discover, what is so much enquired after, the principium Individuationis, and that ’tis plain is Existence it self, which determines a Being of any sort to a particular time and place incommunicable to two Beings of the same kind. Berkeley, in turn, is content to simply declare his Nominalistic allegiance and leave the matter at that. But it is a universally received maxim, that everything which exists, is particular. Now a philosopher committed to the principle that significant changes of philosophical outlook are not simply matters of changing taste – that disappear- ances of great philosophical problems are not akin to changes in fashion – must wonder what lies behind the disappearance of what was such an important problem for so long a time. That said, my aim here is to explore what philosophical reasons, as opposed to historical or sociological ones, lie behind http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis Brill

Nominalism and the Disappearance of the Problem of Individuation

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
Copyright © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
2666-4283
eISSN
2666-4275
DOI
10.30965/26664275-00501012
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Nominalism and the Disappearance of the Problem of Individuation Eric M. Rubenstein, Indiana University of Pennsylvania While the Medievals spilled much ink over the Problem of Individuation, the Moderns scarcely mention it. For instance, while Descartes ignores the problem entirely, Locke has only the following to say. From what has been said, ’tis easy to discover, what is so much enquired after, the principium Individuationis, and that ’tis plain is Existence it self, which determines a Being of any sort to a particular time and place incommunicable to two Beings of the same kind. Berkeley, in turn, is content to simply declare his Nominalistic allegiance and leave the matter at that. But it is a universally received maxim, that everything which exists, is particular. Now a philosopher committed to the principle that significant changes of philosophical outlook are not simply matters of changing taste – that disappear- ances of great philosophical problems are not akin to changes in fashion – must wonder what lies behind the disappearance of what was such an important problem for so long a time. That said, my aim here is to explore what philosophical reasons, as opposed to historical or sociological ones, lie behind

Journal

History of Philosophy and Logical AnalysisBrill

Published: Apr 5, 2002

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