Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Neither “True” nor “False” nor Meaningless: Meditation on the Pragmatics of Knowing Becoming

Neither “True” nor “False” nor Meaningless: Meditation on the Pragmatics of Knowing Becoming Contemporary Pragmatism Vol. 1, No. 1 (June 2004), 61-81 Editions Rodopi © 2004 Floyd Merrell Meinongian `objects' are evoked in an effort to critique and expand upon traditional theories of reference. The argument stems from an account of Peirce's categories of meaning in light of vague, contradictory, inconsistent, general, incomplete, and incompleteable signs. In addition to signs as either `true', `false', or meaningless, the function of imaginary numbers reveals the possibility of a sign's being both `true' and `false' or neither `true' nor `false', over time, and dialogically speaking. This demands a tolerance for vagueness, ambiguity, contradiction, and incessantly changing meaning. 1. Strange Objects Alexis von Meinong proposes two fundamental theses: (1) that there are "objects" that do not exist, and (2) that "objects" that are such that there are no such "objects" are nonetheless constituted in some way or other and thus may be made the subject of meaningful predications. These notorious theses are on a collision course with virtually all theories of reference since Gottlob Frege.1 Bertrand Russell (1905), in particular criticizes Meinong's impossible mental objects with the suggestion that we should handily dispense with all such unwanted guests. However, brief exploration of Meinong's strange jungle http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Contemporary Pragmatism Brill

Neither “True” nor “False” nor Meaningless: Meditation on the Pragmatics of Knowing Becoming

Contemporary Pragmatism , Volume 1 (1): 61 – Apr 21, 2004

Loading next page...
 
/lp/brill/neither-true-nor-false-nor-meaningless-meditation-on-the-pragmatics-of-LK9QCgwl6b
Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© Copyright 2004 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
1572-3429
eISSN
1875-8185
DOI
10.1163/18758185-90000128
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Contemporary Pragmatism Vol. 1, No. 1 (June 2004), 61-81 Editions Rodopi © 2004 Floyd Merrell Meinongian `objects' are evoked in an effort to critique and expand upon traditional theories of reference. The argument stems from an account of Peirce's categories of meaning in light of vague, contradictory, inconsistent, general, incomplete, and incompleteable signs. In addition to signs as either `true', `false', or meaningless, the function of imaginary numbers reveals the possibility of a sign's being both `true' and `false' or neither `true' nor `false', over time, and dialogically speaking. This demands a tolerance for vagueness, ambiguity, contradiction, and incessantly changing meaning. 1. Strange Objects Alexis von Meinong proposes two fundamental theses: (1) that there are "objects" that do not exist, and (2) that "objects" that are such that there are no such "objects" are nonetheless constituted in some way or other and thus may be made the subject of meaningful predications. These notorious theses are on a collision course with virtually all theories of reference since Gottlob Frege.1 Bertrand Russell (1905), in particular criticizes Meinong's impossible mental objects with the suggestion that we should handily dispense with all such unwanted guests. However, brief exploration of Meinong's strange jungle

Journal

Contemporary PragmatismBrill

Published: Apr 21, 2004

There are no references for this article.