Naturalized Virtue Ethics and the Epistemological Gap

Naturalized Virtue Ethics and the Epistemological Gap [ JMP 1.2 (2004) 197-209] ISSN 1740-4681 © The Continuum Publishing Group Ltd 2004, The Tower Building, 11 York Road, London SE1 7NX and 15 East 26th Street, Suite 1703, New York, NY 10010, USA. Naturalized Virtue Ethics and the Epistemological Gap S TEPHEN R. B ROWN * Department of Theology and Philosophy Briar Cliff University 3303 Rebecca St Sioux City, IA 51104, USA browns@briarcliff.edu The proponent of the epistemological gap maintains that value claims are justified in a different way than are nonvalue claims. I show that a neo- Aristotelian naturalized virtue ethics does not fall prey to this gap. There are ethical claims concerning human beings that are epistemically justi- fied in a way logically identical to the way in which are justified certain nonethical claims about human and nonhuman organisms. This demon- stration (1) lends credibility to naturalized virtue ethics, (2) calls into question the very notion of an epistemological gap, and (3) confronts anti- naturalists with a dilemma. he proponent of an epistemological gap maintains that value claims are justified in a different way than are nonvalue claims. The existence of such a gap would pose a significant problem for the project of ethical http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of Moral Philosophy Brill

Naturalized Virtue Ethics and the Epistemological Gap

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Publisher
BRILL
Copyright
© 2004 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
1740-4681
eISSN
1745-5243
D.O.I.
10.1177/174046810400100205
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

[ JMP 1.2 (2004) 197-209] ISSN 1740-4681 © The Continuum Publishing Group Ltd 2004, The Tower Building, 11 York Road, London SE1 7NX and 15 East 26th Street, Suite 1703, New York, NY 10010, USA. Naturalized Virtue Ethics and the Epistemological Gap S TEPHEN R. B ROWN * Department of Theology and Philosophy Briar Cliff University 3303 Rebecca St Sioux City, IA 51104, USA browns@briarcliff.edu The proponent of the epistemological gap maintains that value claims are justified in a different way than are nonvalue claims. I show that a neo- Aristotelian naturalized virtue ethics does not fall prey to this gap. There are ethical claims concerning human beings that are epistemically justi- fied in a way logically identical to the way in which are justified certain nonethical claims about human and nonhuman organisms. This demon- stration (1) lends credibility to naturalized virtue ethics, (2) calls into question the very notion of an epistemological gap, and (3) confronts anti- naturalists with a dilemma. he proponent of an epistemological gap maintains that value claims are justified in a different way than are nonvalue claims. The existence of such a gap would pose a significant problem for the project of ethical

Journal

Journal of Moral PhilosophyBrill

Published: Jan 1, 2004

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