Moral Perception and the Contents of Experience

Moral Perception and the Contents of Experience I defend the thesis that at least some moral properties can be part of the contents of experience. I argue for this claim using a contrast argument , a type of argument commonly found in the literature on the philosophy of perception. I first appeal to psychological research on what I call emotionally empathetic dysfunctional individuals ( eedi s) to establish a phenomenal contrast between eedi s and normal individuals in some moral situations. I then argue that the best explanation for this contrast, assuming non-skeptical moral realism, is that badness is represented in the normal individual’s experience but not in the eedi ’s experience. I consider and reject four alternative explanations of the contrast. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of Moral Philosophy Brill

Moral Perception and the Contents of Experience

Journal of Moral Philosophy, Volume 13 (3): 294 – May 13, 2016

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© 2014 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
Subject
Articles
ISSN
1740-4681
eISSN
1745-5243
D.O.I.
10.1163/17455243-4681063
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

I defend the thesis that at least some moral properties can be part of the contents of experience. I argue for this claim using a contrast argument , a type of argument commonly found in the literature on the philosophy of perception. I first appeal to psychological research on what I call emotionally empathetic dysfunctional individuals ( eedi s) to establish a phenomenal contrast between eedi s and normal individuals in some moral situations. I then argue that the best explanation for this contrast, assuming non-skeptical moral realism, is that badness is represented in the normal individual’s experience but not in the eedi ’s experience. I consider and reject four alternative explanations of the contrast.

Journal

Journal of Moral PhilosophyBrill

Published: May 13, 2016

Keywords: metaethics; moral epistemology; moral perception; perception of higher-order properties; ethics; moral realism

References

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