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In the Name of Philosophy

In the Name of Philosophy 37 In the Name of Philosophy JOHN LLEWELYN University of Edinburgh 1. In the Name of God In the discussion which followed Levinas' presentation at Louvain of the paper entitled "The Name of God in Certain Talmudic Texts," Antoine Vergote points out that Levinas had said that the revelation of the name of God is a relation that is irreducible to knowledge but had denied that ethical responsibility before another human being is a relation. Was Levinas not therefore inconsistent when he maintained that the divine revelation can be equated with (se ramene a) human responsibility?1 Levinas replies by distinguishing two senses of "rela- tion." As ordinarily understood a relation is a compresence of at least two terms.2 But God is not present as a term. Each of God's names is a proper name subsumed under the common name Name. His proper names-namely, El or Eloha or Elohim (God), Shaddai (Almighty), Dayyan ( Judge), Rachum (Merciful), Hannun (Gracious), Tzaddik (Righteous), Adonai (My Lord), etc.-name modes of God's presence, but that pres- ence is not a presence of a term. It is a proximity (shekinah) in an absence and separation denoted by the words "holy," "saint," "kadosh." Hence the http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Research in Phenomenology Brill

In the Name of Philosophy

Research in Phenomenology , Volume 28 (1): 37 – Jan 1, 1998

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© 1998 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
0085-5553
eISSN
1569-1640
DOI
10.1163/156916498X00038
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

37 In the Name of Philosophy JOHN LLEWELYN University of Edinburgh 1. In the Name of God In the discussion which followed Levinas' presentation at Louvain of the paper entitled "The Name of God in Certain Talmudic Texts," Antoine Vergote points out that Levinas had said that the revelation of the name of God is a relation that is irreducible to knowledge but had denied that ethical responsibility before another human being is a relation. Was Levinas not therefore inconsistent when he maintained that the divine revelation can be equated with (se ramene a) human responsibility?1 Levinas replies by distinguishing two senses of "rela- tion." As ordinarily understood a relation is a compresence of at least two terms.2 But God is not present as a term. Each of God's names is a proper name subsumed under the common name Name. His proper names-namely, El or Eloha or Elohim (God), Shaddai (Almighty), Dayyan ( Judge), Rachum (Merciful), Hannun (Gracious), Tzaddik (Righteous), Adonai (My Lord), etc.-name modes of God's presence, but that pres- ence is not a presence of a term. It is a proximity (shekinah) in an absence and separation denoted by the words "holy," "saint," "kadosh." Hence the

Journal

Research in PhenomenologyBrill

Published: Jan 1, 1998

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