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Husserl's Presuppositionless Philosophy

Husserl's Presuppositionless Philosophy 136 Husserl's Presuppositionless Philosophy TERESA REED-DOWNING Rockhurst College It is well known that Husserl wanted his philosophy to be "presupposition- less." The idea of a presuppositionless philosophy tends to arouse immediate objections, yet it is an idea which is far from clear. In this paper, I would like to clarify what Husserl meant by "presuppositionless philosophy." In parti- cular, I want to show the relationship of presuppositionlessness to Husserl's ideal of a self-justifying science, and to offer this relationship as the context for interpreting the epoche or "suspension" of the so-called natural attitude. This procedure has at least two advantages: it gives a functional interpreta- tion of phenomenological method, and it shows why, for Husserl, phenome- nology must become transcendental in order to be philosophical. Before undertaking this, it will be useful to review some of the received opinions about Husserl's idea of presuppositionlessness, progressing from the least to the most radical suggestions. I Many different interpretations have been offered in the literature for what Husserl intended by the term "presuppositionless philosophy." Erazim Kohak emphasizes the relationship of "presuppositionlessness" to Husserl's "Principle of All Principles." This Principle, stated in Ideas I, reads as follows: ... that every originary http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Research in Phenomenology Brill

Husserl's Presuppositionless Philosophy

Research in Phenomenology , Volume 20 (1): 136 – Jan 1, 1990

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© 1990 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
0085-5553
eISSN
1569-1640
DOI
10.1163/156916490X00081
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

136 Husserl's Presuppositionless Philosophy TERESA REED-DOWNING Rockhurst College It is well known that Husserl wanted his philosophy to be "presupposition- less." The idea of a presuppositionless philosophy tends to arouse immediate objections, yet it is an idea which is far from clear. In this paper, I would like to clarify what Husserl meant by "presuppositionless philosophy." In parti- cular, I want to show the relationship of presuppositionlessness to Husserl's ideal of a self-justifying science, and to offer this relationship as the context for interpreting the epoche or "suspension" of the so-called natural attitude. This procedure has at least two advantages: it gives a functional interpreta- tion of phenomenological method, and it shows why, for Husserl, phenome- nology must become transcendental in order to be philosophical. Before undertaking this, it will be useful to review some of the received opinions about Husserl's idea of presuppositionlessness, progressing from the least to the most radical suggestions. I Many different interpretations have been offered in the literature for what Husserl intended by the term "presuppositionless philosophy." Erazim Kohak emphasizes the relationship of "presuppositionlessness" to Husserl's "Principle of All Principles." This Principle, stated in Ideas I, reads as follows: ... that every originary

Journal

Research in PhenomenologyBrill

Published: Jan 1, 1990

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