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Hermeneutics without Relativism: Husserl's Theory of Mind

Hermeneutics without Relativism: Husserl's Theory of Mind 127 Hermeneutics without Relativism: Husserl's Theory of Mind RICHARD COBB-STEVENS Boston College Contemporary dissatisfaction with the theme of representation testifies to a significant change in the metaphors guiding philosophical inquiry. The central metaphor is no longer seeing, but doing. William James' decision to consider truth as pragmatic adaption rather than as accurate representation no longer seems as shocking to us as it was to Bradley. We have gradually become accustomed to the idea that knowing is a strategy for negotiating with reality, rather than a contemplative insight into essences. Although we maintain a verbal allegiance to ideals like objective criteria and rationally discernible ethical standards, we really think of knowing as subjective interpretation and of ethics as the enlightened management of conflicting personal preference. The rejection of the metaphor of knowing as seeing is not complete, however, since it is commonplace to find criticism of essential insight combined with emphasis on the perspectival character of all knowing. Moreover, whereas the theme of perspective traditionally described the situated status of our intuitive access to what is, now we tend more and more to understand perspectivity in a relativistic manner. Truth claims are merely points of view, in the sense http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Research in Phenomenology Brill

Hermeneutics without Relativism: Husserl's Theory of Mind

Research in Phenomenology , Volume 12 (1): 127 – Jan 1, 1982

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© 1982 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
0085-5553
eISSN
1569-1640
DOI
10.1163/156916482X00080
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

127 Hermeneutics without Relativism: Husserl's Theory of Mind RICHARD COBB-STEVENS Boston College Contemporary dissatisfaction with the theme of representation testifies to a significant change in the metaphors guiding philosophical inquiry. The central metaphor is no longer seeing, but doing. William James' decision to consider truth as pragmatic adaption rather than as accurate representation no longer seems as shocking to us as it was to Bradley. We have gradually become accustomed to the idea that knowing is a strategy for negotiating with reality, rather than a contemplative insight into essences. Although we maintain a verbal allegiance to ideals like objective criteria and rationally discernible ethical standards, we really think of knowing as subjective interpretation and of ethics as the enlightened management of conflicting personal preference. The rejection of the metaphor of knowing as seeing is not complete, however, since it is commonplace to find criticism of essential insight combined with emphasis on the perspectival character of all knowing. Moreover, whereas the theme of perspective traditionally described the situated status of our intuitive access to what is, now we tend more and more to understand perspectivity in a relativistic manner. Truth claims are merely points of view, in the sense

Journal

Research in PhenomenologyBrill

Published: Jan 1, 1982

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