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Gregory Moore and Thomas H. Brobjer (eds): Nietzsche and Science. Aldershot: Ashgate 2004, ISBN: 0-7546-3402-7; £ 49.95, EUR 87,50 (Hardback); 233 pages

Gregory Moore and Thomas H. Brobjer (eds): Nietzsche and Science. Aldershot: Ashgate 2004, ISBN:... 254 Book Reviews – Buchbesprechungen account empirical data. After briefly explicating the legal notion of a corporation as a fictional person, the authors consider in what respects corporations, like individuals, have moral responsibility. Werhane and Freeman argue that corporations are moral agents, but not moral persons. Although corporations, like individuals, can be held morally responsible for their actions, corporations are not intentional agents: ‘… corporations exhibit intentional behaviour, engage in reciprocal accountability relationships, are subject to rights, and are said to act. But their so-called intentions, their accountability relationships, and their ‘actions’ are the collective result of decisions made by individual persons.’ (522) The notion of collective action is useful, say Werhane and Freeman, in understanding why one typically holds a corporation and not merely its managers and agents responsible for its ‘actions’. Each individual input becomes transformed both as it mixes with other inputs and as managerial directives are interpreted. The result often is a collective action that differs from the actions of its constituents. Thus, in principle, there could be a questionable outcome of corporate decision-making that results from blameless individual actions. This can result in moral blindness on the part of the individual members of the http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis Brill

Gregory Moore and Thomas H. Brobjer (eds): Nietzsche and Science. Aldershot: Ashgate 2004, ISBN: 0-7546-3402-7; £ 49.95, EUR 87,50 (Hardback); 233 pages

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
Copyright © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
2666-4283
eISSN
2666-4275
DOI
10.30965/26664275-00901015
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

254 Book Reviews – Buchbesprechungen account empirical data. After briefly explicating the legal notion of a corporation as a fictional person, the authors consider in what respects corporations, like individuals, have moral responsibility. Werhane and Freeman argue that corporations are moral agents, but not moral persons. Although corporations, like individuals, can be held morally responsible for their actions, corporations are not intentional agents: ‘… corporations exhibit intentional behaviour, engage in reciprocal accountability relationships, are subject to rights, and are said to act. But their so-called intentions, their accountability relationships, and their ‘actions’ are the collective result of decisions made by individual persons.’ (522) The notion of collective action is useful, say Werhane and Freeman, in understanding why one typically holds a corporation and not merely its managers and agents responsible for its ‘actions’. Each individual input becomes transformed both as it mixes with other inputs and as managerial directives are interpreted. The result often is a collective action that differs from the actions of its constituents. Thus, in principle, there could be a questionable outcome of corporate decision-making that results from blameless individual actions. This can result in moral blindness on the part of the individual members of the

Journal

History of Philosophy and Logical AnalysisBrill

Published: Apr 5, 2006

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