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Gradations of Guessing: Preliminary Sketches and Suggestions

Gradations of Guessing: Preliminary Sketches and Suggestions Contemporary Pragmatism Vol. 10, No. 2 (December 2013), 135­154 Editions Rodopi ©2013 Mark Tschaepe Guessing is considered a central function of scientific inquiry by most scientists and philosophers, but it has mostly been neglected as an object of philosophical analysis. I supply an initial remedy to this neglect that provides a general definition of guessing that applies to scientific inquiry. In addition, I combat the assumption that the meaning of guessing is monosemic by providing examples of various types, or gradations, of guessing. The variation of these types indicates that guessing is not merely an unambiguous, simplistic process at which philosophers of science can merely hand-wave before moving on to deduction and induction. Rather, accounting for the gradations of guessing contributes to the argument that guessing is a logical process that is an appropriate object of philosophical analysis instead of a process that necessarily falls outside of rational reconstruction. As a logical process, guessing is clearly distinguished from induction and deduction. This distinction provides an important domain of philosophical inquiry that merits further investigation, especially within philosophy of science. "But we must conquer the truth by guessing, or not at all." ­ C.S. Peirce There is little doubt http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Contemporary Pragmatism Brill

Gradations of Guessing: Preliminary Sketches and Suggestions

Contemporary Pragmatism , Volume 10 (2): 135 – Apr 21, 2013

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© Copyright 2013 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
1572-3429
eISSN
1875-8185
DOI
10.1163/18758185-90000263
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Contemporary Pragmatism Vol. 10, No. 2 (December 2013), 135­154 Editions Rodopi ©2013 Mark Tschaepe Guessing is considered a central function of scientific inquiry by most scientists and philosophers, but it has mostly been neglected as an object of philosophical analysis. I supply an initial remedy to this neglect that provides a general definition of guessing that applies to scientific inquiry. In addition, I combat the assumption that the meaning of guessing is monosemic by providing examples of various types, or gradations, of guessing. The variation of these types indicates that guessing is not merely an unambiguous, simplistic process at which philosophers of science can merely hand-wave before moving on to deduction and induction. Rather, accounting for the gradations of guessing contributes to the argument that guessing is a logical process that is an appropriate object of philosophical analysis instead of a process that necessarily falls outside of rational reconstruction. As a logical process, guessing is clearly distinguished from induction and deduction. This distinction provides an important domain of philosophical inquiry that merits further investigation, especially within philosophy of science. "But we must conquer the truth by guessing, or not at all." ­ C.S. Peirce There is little doubt

Journal

Contemporary PragmatismBrill

Published: Apr 21, 2013

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