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Formal Logic and Formal Ontology

Formal Logic and Formal Ontology 95 Formal Logic and Formal Ontology JOHN SCANLON Duquesne University I. THE FUNCTION OF FORMAL ONTOLOGY Part I of Formal and Transcendental Logic' has a significance which can be appreciated not only by Husserl scholars and phenomenological philosophers but by all who are interested in the philosophy of logic. Although Husserl does not attempt to develop a logical system there, he does try to clarify the sense of objective formal logic with regard to its intrinsic structures, aims, and scope, without allowing any transcendental questions to intrude. Many of the procedures which Husserl presents as integral to objective formal logic can, if reformulated, be recognized as having since become explicit standard practice in logic, mostly indepen- dently of direct influence from Husserl.2 2 On the other hand, one specific concept suggested by Husserl, that of a formal ontology, seems a particularly troublesome impediment to a wider appreciation of Husserl's views on logic. And it is introduced in the context of his discussion of the interesting topic of the relation between formal logic and formal mathematics. His interpretation of the difference between them as involving basically different purposes for which a logical system can be developed and studied seems http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Research in Phenomenology Brill

Formal Logic and Formal Ontology

Research in Phenomenology , Volume 5 (1): 95 – Jan 1, 1975

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© 1975 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
0085-5553
eISSN
1569-1640
DOI
10.1163/156916475X00123
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

95 Formal Logic and Formal Ontology JOHN SCANLON Duquesne University I. THE FUNCTION OF FORMAL ONTOLOGY Part I of Formal and Transcendental Logic' has a significance which can be appreciated not only by Husserl scholars and phenomenological philosophers but by all who are interested in the philosophy of logic. Although Husserl does not attempt to develop a logical system there, he does try to clarify the sense of objective formal logic with regard to its intrinsic structures, aims, and scope, without allowing any transcendental questions to intrude. Many of the procedures which Husserl presents as integral to objective formal logic can, if reformulated, be recognized as having since become explicit standard practice in logic, mostly indepen- dently of direct influence from Husserl.2 2 On the other hand, one specific concept suggested by Husserl, that of a formal ontology, seems a particularly troublesome impediment to a wider appreciation of Husserl's views on logic. And it is introduced in the context of his discussion of the interesting topic of the relation between formal logic and formal mathematics. His interpretation of the difference between them as involving basically different purposes for which a logical system can be developed and studied seems

Journal

Research in PhenomenologyBrill

Published: Jan 1, 1975

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