Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Erkenntnistheoretischer Dualismus

Erkenntnistheoretischer Dualismus Kant und das Geist-Gehirn-Problem Tobias Schlicht, Universität Tübingen The dominant position in current debates on the mind-body problem is some ver- sion of physicalism, according to which the mind is reducible to the brain and mental phenomena are ultimately explainable in physical terms. But there seems to be an explanatory gap between physicalistic descriptions of neuronal processes and the subjectivity of conscious experience. Some dualists conclude that, therefore, consciousness must be ontologically distinct from any physical properties or enti- ties. This article introduces and argues for a different perspective on these issues, namely, an epistemological dualism – a nonreductive position which is neither a ver- sion of physicalism nor an ontological dualism. It is argued that Kant holds this epistemological dualism implicitly as a consequence of his critical epistemology. On the one hand, he stresses the explanatory gap between the mental and the physical. On the basis of his theory of subjectivity set out in the Transcendental Deduction, Kant provides an explanation of why the gap cannot be closed empirically, as the physicalist promises. On the other hand, in his criticism of Descartes’ dualism in the Paralogisms-chapter, Kant argues that an ontological conclusion on the basis of this epistemological http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis Brill

Erkenntnistheoretischer Dualismus

History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis , Volume 10 (1): 24 – Apr 5, 2007

Loading next page...
 
/lp/brill/erkenntnistheoretischer-dualismus-XycpzsMQOP
Publisher
Brill
Copyright
Copyright © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
2666-4283
eISSN
2666-4275
DOI
10.30965/26664275-01001007
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Kant und das Geist-Gehirn-Problem Tobias Schlicht, Universität Tübingen The dominant position in current debates on the mind-body problem is some ver- sion of physicalism, according to which the mind is reducible to the brain and mental phenomena are ultimately explainable in physical terms. But there seems to be an explanatory gap between physicalistic descriptions of neuronal processes and the subjectivity of conscious experience. Some dualists conclude that, therefore, consciousness must be ontologically distinct from any physical properties or enti- ties. This article introduces and argues for a different perspective on these issues, namely, an epistemological dualism – a nonreductive position which is neither a ver- sion of physicalism nor an ontological dualism. It is argued that Kant holds this epistemological dualism implicitly as a consequence of his critical epistemology. On the one hand, he stresses the explanatory gap between the mental and the physical. On the basis of his theory of subjectivity set out in the Transcendental Deduction, Kant provides an explanation of why the gap cannot be closed empirically, as the physicalist promises. On the other hand, in his criticism of Descartes’ dualism in the Paralogisms-chapter, Kant argues that an ontological conclusion on the basis of this epistemological

Journal

History of Philosophy and Logical AnalysisBrill

Published: Apr 5, 2007

There are no references for this article.