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Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing, written by Duncan Pritchard

Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing, written by Duncan... Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016, 264 pp.In this innovative, clearly written, and wide-ranging book, Duncan Pritchard1offers a new response to skepticism. In the course of doing so, he argues that it is superior to a number of competing responses to skepticism currently on offer. As a result, this book will be of interest both to those curious about Pritchard’s proposal, as well as to those who wish for a survey of contemporary responses to skepticism and a discussion of their strengths and weaknesses.In brief, Pritchard argues in his book that there are two different skeptical problems (more on those in a minute) that demand two separate, but mutually reinforcing, responses. The response to the first involves the Wittgensteinian claim that denials of skeptical hypotheses are hinge propositions that cannot be believed, while the response to the second involves the McDowellian claim that in paradigm cases of perceptual knowledge the knowledge in question enjoys a rational support that is both factive and reflectively accessible.In the rest of this review I will briefly outline Pritchard’s chapters and add some critical comments.Chapter 1. In the first chapter, Pritchard introduces the first form of skepticism, closure-based skepticism, which he presents as a triad http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Grazer Philosophische Studien Brill

Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing, written by Duncan Pritchard

Grazer Philosophische Studien , Volume 93 (4): 7 – Nov 7, 2016

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
Copyright © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
Subject
Book Reviews
ISSN
0165-9227
eISSN
1875-6735
DOI
10.1163/18756735-09304005
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016, 264 pp.In this innovative, clearly written, and wide-ranging book, Duncan Pritchard1offers a new response to skepticism. In the course of doing so, he argues that it is superior to a number of competing responses to skepticism currently on offer. As a result, this book will be of interest both to those curious about Pritchard’s proposal, as well as to those who wish for a survey of contemporary responses to skepticism and a discussion of their strengths and weaknesses.In brief, Pritchard argues in his book that there are two different skeptical problems (more on those in a minute) that demand two separate, but mutually reinforcing, responses. The response to the first involves the Wittgensteinian claim that denials of skeptical hypotheses are hinge propositions that cannot be believed, while the response to the second involves the McDowellian claim that in paradigm cases of perceptual knowledge the knowledge in question enjoys a rational support that is both factive and reflectively accessible.In the rest of this review I will briefly outline Pritchard’s chapters and add some critical comments.Chapter 1. In the first chapter, Pritchard introduces the first form of skepticism, closure-based skepticism, which he presents as a triad

Journal

Grazer Philosophische StudienBrill

Published: Nov 7, 2016

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