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reason as thc uitimate point of reference of human existence. The whole recent crisis of philosophical thought is characterized by a fundamental suspicion with respect to the certitudes and axioms of the traditional modes of thought. Thc reason is that this crisis does no longer concern particular problems of philosophy, but much rather the deeper religious pre-suppositions of Western philosophy as a whole since thc time of Renaissance. It is in the first place a crisis of belief, which is not to be overcome with the aid of rational philosophical arguments. DEL VECCHIO's work is not affected by this crisis, it is noteven concerned with it. To hirn the Kantian critique of pure reason is still the definitive solution of the epistemological problems concerning mathematics and natural science. His confrontation of transcendental idealism with positivism and historicism is essentially oriented to the philosophical situation of the XIXth century. Neither the new turn in historicism since WILHELM DILTHEY, nor the rise and powerful developmentofmodernphenomenO'logy and existentialism playapart in this philosophical confrontation. His view of sociology is equally oriented to the situation of this science in the last century and does not take into acoount its development in recent time.
Philosophia Reformata – Brill
Published: Feb 20, 1957
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