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CONCILIATIONISM WITHOUT UNIQUENESS

CONCILIATIONISM WITHOUT UNIQUENESS Grazer Philosophische Studien 88 (2013), 161­188. CONCILIATIONISM WITHOUT UNIQUENESS Matthew LEE University of Notre Dame Summary I defend Conciliationism: rationality requires belief revision of epistemic peers who nd themselves in disagreement and lack dispute-independent reason to suspect each other of error. (Kelly 2010) argues that Conciliationists are committed to the Uniqueness esis: a given body of evidence rationalizes a unique degree of con dence for a given proposition. (Ballantyne and Co man 2012) cogently critique Kelly's argument and propose an improved version. I contend that their version of the argument is unsound, and I o er some friendly amendments. But I show that even this amended argument threatens only extreme versions of Conciliationism. 1. Introduction At center stage in the epistemology of disagreement is Conciliationism-- the view that peer disagreement calls for a conciliatory, rather than a dogmatic, response. Somewhat more precisely, Conciliationism is the view that when you nd yourself in disagreement with an epistemic peer,1 a change in belief (or con dence) is rationally required, provided you have no independent reason to suspect your peer of error.2 Conciliationism as such does not dictate just how your view should change;3 but it categori1. e relevant notion of http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Grazer Philosophische Studien Brill

CONCILIATIONISM WITHOUT UNIQUENESS

LEE, Matthew
Grazer Philosophische Studien , Volume 88 (1): 161 – Jan 1, 2013
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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
Copyright 2013 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
0165-9227
eISSN
1875-6735
DOI
10.1163/9789401210508_009
Publisher site
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Abstract

Grazer Philosophische Studien 88 (2013), 161­188. CONCILIATIONISM WITHOUT UNIQUENESS Matthew LEE University of Notre Dame Summary I defend Conciliationism: rationality requires belief revision of epistemic peers who nd themselves in disagreement and lack dispute-independent reason to suspect each other of error. (Kelly 2010) argues that Conciliationists are committed to the Uniqueness esis: a given body of evidence rationalizes a unique degree of con dence for a given proposition. (Ballantyne and Co man 2012) cogently critique Kelly's argument and propose an improved version. I contend that their version of the argument is unsound, and I o er some friendly amendments. But I show that even this amended argument threatens only extreme versions of Conciliationism. 1. Introduction At center stage in the epistemology of disagreement is Conciliationism-- the view that peer disagreement calls for a conciliatory, rather than a dogmatic, response. Somewhat more precisely, Conciliationism is the view that when you nd yourself in disagreement with an epistemic peer,1 a change in belief (or con dence) is rationally required, provided you have no independent reason to suspect your peer of error.2 Conciliationism as such does not dictate just how your view should change;3 but it categori1. e relevant notion of

Journal

Grazer Philosophische Studien – Brill

Published: Jan 1, 2013

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