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Comparative Phenomenology of Mental Activity: Memory, Hallucination, and Fantasy Contrasted with Imagination

Comparative Phenomenology of Mental Activity: Memory, Hallucination, and Fantasy Contrasted with... 1 Comparative Phenomenology of Mental Activity: Memory, Hallucination, and Fantasy Contrasted with Imagination EDWARD S. CASEY Yale University It is a quite remarkable fact that many previous philosophies and psych- ologies of mind, however perspicuous or profound they may be in other ways, have failed to provide adequate accounts of basic differences between imagining, remembering, hallucinating, and fantasying. Even the most ele- mentary descriptions of such differences are often lacking. Perhaps it has been presumed that the four acts in question are so closely affiliated as not to need descriptive differentiation. In this vein, they are frequently regard- ed as sibling acts having the same progenitor: perception. Yet each of the acts is related to perception very differently, ranging from apparent repli- cation (in hallucination) to distinct discontinuity (in imagination). It is not my present purpose, however, to delineate this particular series of relation- ships. Rather, in this essay I shall concentrate on eidetic differences be- tween imagining on the one hand and memory, hallucination, and fantasy on the other. Each of the latter three acts will be described in terms of its most salient features, features which serve to distinguish it from imagining in fundamental respects.' Thus http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Research in Phenomenology Brill

Comparative Phenomenology of Mental Activity: Memory, Hallucination, and Fantasy Contrasted with Imagination

Research in Phenomenology , Volume 6 (1): 1 – Jan 1, 1976

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© 1976 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
0085-5553
eISSN
1569-1640
DOI
10.1163/156916476X00014
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

1 Comparative Phenomenology of Mental Activity: Memory, Hallucination, and Fantasy Contrasted with Imagination EDWARD S. CASEY Yale University It is a quite remarkable fact that many previous philosophies and psych- ologies of mind, however perspicuous or profound they may be in other ways, have failed to provide adequate accounts of basic differences between imagining, remembering, hallucinating, and fantasying. Even the most ele- mentary descriptions of such differences are often lacking. Perhaps it has been presumed that the four acts in question are so closely affiliated as not to need descriptive differentiation. In this vein, they are frequently regard- ed as sibling acts having the same progenitor: perception. Yet each of the acts is related to perception very differently, ranging from apparent repli- cation (in hallucination) to distinct discontinuity (in imagination). It is not my present purpose, however, to delineate this particular series of relation- ships. Rather, in this essay I shall concentrate on eidetic differences be- tween imagining on the one hand and memory, hallucination, and fantasy on the other. Each of the latter three acts will be described in terms of its most salient features, features which serve to distinguish it from imagining in fundamental respects.' Thus

Journal

Research in PhenomenologyBrill

Published: Jan 1, 1976

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