Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Collusion in International Organizations: How States Benefit from the Authority of Secretariats

Collusion in International Organizations: How States Benefit from the Authority of Secretariats Global Governance 23 (2017), 601–618 Collusion in International Organizations: How States Benefit from the Authority of Secretariats Hylke Dijkstra In the theoretical literature on the authority of international secretariats, ac- ademics often dichotomize between states and secretariats. Even when they account for the fact that states are often divided, they normally adopt a two- step approach: states first resolve their own differences before they entertain relations with secretariats. This article provides an alternative perspective. It argues that individual or groups of states may collude with like-minded sec- retariats to achieve outcomes at the expense of other states. Working in- formally together is beneficial. States can benefit from the rational-legal, delegated, moral, and expert authority of secretariats. States and secretariats can also exchange resources. The article illustrates this perspective through two case studies: the NATO intervention in Libya in 2011 and the European Union’s military operation in Chad in 2008. KEYWORDS: international secretari- ats, authority, principal-agent model. THE AUTHORITY OF INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIATS HAS BECOME A MAJOR TOPIC in the discipline of international relations. From Jacques Delors at the helm of the European Commission to the technical expertise of officials in the World Health Organization (WHO), academics have shown how nonstate http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations Brill

Collusion in International Organizations: How States Benefit from the Authority of Secretariats

Loading next page...
 
/lp/brill/collusion-in-international-organizations-how-states-benefit-from-the-u2wqjodgRS
Publisher
Brill
Copyright
Copyright © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
1075-2846
eISSN
1942-6720
DOI
10.1163/19426720-02304006
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Global Governance 23 (2017), 601–618 Collusion in International Organizations: How States Benefit from the Authority of Secretariats Hylke Dijkstra In the theoretical literature on the authority of international secretariats, ac- ademics often dichotomize between states and secretariats. Even when they account for the fact that states are often divided, they normally adopt a two- step approach: states first resolve their own differences before they entertain relations with secretariats. This article provides an alternative perspective. It argues that individual or groups of states may collude with like-minded sec- retariats to achieve outcomes at the expense of other states. Working in- formally together is beneficial. States can benefit from the rational-legal, delegated, moral, and expert authority of secretariats. States and secretariats can also exchange resources. The article illustrates this perspective through two case studies: the NATO intervention in Libya in 2011 and the European Union’s military operation in Chad in 2008. KEYWORDS: international secretari- ats, authority, principal-agent model. THE AUTHORITY OF INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIATS HAS BECOME A MAJOR TOPIC in the discipline of international relations. From Jacques Delors at the helm of the European Commission to the technical expertise of officials in the World Health Organization (WHO), academics have shown how nonstate

Journal

Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International OrganizationsBrill

Published: Aug 19, 2017

There are no references for this article.