Cognitive Biases and Moral Luck

Cognitive Biases and Moral Luck Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (2010) 372–386 © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2010 DOI 10.1163/174552410X511464 brill.nl/jmp JOURNAL OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY Cognitive Biases and Moral Luck David Enoch Th e Hebrew University Philosophy Department & Faculty of Law Mount Scopus Campus Jerusalem, 91905, Israel denoch@mscc.huji.ac.il Ehud Guttel Duke Law School and the Hebrew University Faculty of Law Mount Scopus Campus Jerusalem, 91905, Israel ehudg@mscc.huji.ac.il Abstract Some of the recent philosophical literature on moral luck attempts to make headway in the moral-luck debate by employing the resources of empirical psychology, in eff ect arguing that some of the intuitive judgments relevant to the moral-luck debate are best explained – and so presumably explained away – as the output of well-documented cognitive biases. We argue that such attempts are empirically problematic, and furthermore that even if they were not, it is still not at all clear what philosophical signifi cance they would have. Keywords cognitive bias , debunking explanation , moral luck Many of us believe in some version of the control condition on moral respon- sibility and blameworthiness. We believe, roughly speaking, that we are only responsible for what is under our control. In particular, we believe that if two http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of Moral Philosophy Brill

Cognitive Biases and Moral Luck

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© 2010 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
1740-4681
eISSN
1745-5243
D.O.I.
10.1163/174552410X511464
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (2010) 372–386 © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2010 DOI 10.1163/174552410X511464 brill.nl/jmp JOURNAL OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY Cognitive Biases and Moral Luck David Enoch Th e Hebrew University Philosophy Department & Faculty of Law Mount Scopus Campus Jerusalem, 91905, Israel denoch@mscc.huji.ac.il Ehud Guttel Duke Law School and the Hebrew University Faculty of Law Mount Scopus Campus Jerusalem, 91905, Israel ehudg@mscc.huji.ac.il Abstract Some of the recent philosophical literature on moral luck attempts to make headway in the moral-luck debate by employing the resources of empirical psychology, in eff ect arguing that some of the intuitive judgments relevant to the moral-luck debate are best explained – and so presumably explained away – as the output of well-documented cognitive biases. We argue that such attempts are empirically problematic, and furthermore that even if they were not, it is still not at all clear what philosophical signifi cance they would have. Keywords cognitive bias , debunking explanation , moral luck Many of us believe in some version of the control condition on moral respon- sibility and blameworthiness. We believe, roughly speaking, that we are only responsible for what is under our control. In particular, we believe that if two

Journal

Journal of Moral PhilosophyBrill

Published: Jan 1, 2010

Keywords: COGNITIVE BIAS; MORAL LUCK; DEBUNKING EXPLANATION

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