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Can Transcendental Philosophy Endorse Fallibilism?

Can Transcendental Philosophy Endorse Fallibilism? Contemporary Pragmatism Vol. 8, No. 1 (June 2011), 133­151 Editions Rodopi © 2011 The aim of this paper is to apply Charles S. Peirce's pragmatic method to establishing if proponents of transcendental arguments could hold the conclusions of their arguments to be fallibly known. I will thus propose a pragmatic clarification of the concepts of a priority, necessity, and infallibility in order to ascertain if these concepts are unavoidably related or not. I will argue that an a priori knowable necessary proposition is not in principle indubitable, whereas a proposition infallibly known is so. Finally, I will apply these reflections to transcendental philosophy. 1. Introduction I wish to establish whether proponents of transcendental arguments could coherently hold the conclusions of their arguments to be fallibly known. Transcendental arguments are characterized by proposing an a priori line of reasoning and by claiming a necessary status for their conclusions. In so doing, they commonly aim to establish that some aspects of our thinking are conditions of possibility of knowledge and experience.1 Do these characteristics also entail the claim of infallibility for transcendental arguments? This is precisely the question that the paper intends to answer. It is evident that, in order http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Contemporary Pragmatism Brill

Can Transcendental Philosophy Endorse Fallibilism?

Contemporary Pragmatism , Volume 8 (1): 133 – Apr 21, 2011

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© Copyright 2011 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
1572-3429
eISSN
1875-8185
DOI
10.1163/18758185-90000187
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Contemporary Pragmatism Vol. 8, No. 1 (June 2011), 133­151 Editions Rodopi © 2011 The aim of this paper is to apply Charles S. Peirce's pragmatic method to establishing if proponents of transcendental arguments could hold the conclusions of their arguments to be fallibly known. I will thus propose a pragmatic clarification of the concepts of a priority, necessity, and infallibility in order to ascertain if these concepts are unavoidably related or not. I will argue that an a priori knowable necessary proposition is not in principle indubitable, whereas a proposition infallibly known is so. Finally, I will apply these reflections to transcendental philosophy. 1. Introduction I wish to establish whether proponents of transcendental arguments could coherently hold the conclusions of their arguments to be fallibly known. Transcendental arguments are characterized by proposing an a priori line of reasoning and by claiming a necessary status for their conclusions. In so doing, they commonly aim to establish that some aspects of our thinking are conditions of possibility of knowledge and experience.1 Do these characteristics also entail the claim of infallibility for transcendental arguments? This is precisely the question that the paper intends to answer. It is evident that, in order

Journal

Contemporary PragmatismBrill

Published: Apr 21, 2011

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