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Can Peircean Epistemic Perfectionists Bid Farewell to Deweyan Democracy?

Can Peircean Epistemic Perfectionists Bid Farewell to Deweyan Democracy? Contemporary Pragmatism Vol. 6, No. 2 (December 2009), 165­183 Editions Rodopi © 2009 There is a tension between Robert Talisse's rejection of Deweyan democracy and his project of formulating a workable Peircean conception of democracy. If he follows Rawls in taking reasonable pluralism to be a permanent condition, then his Peircean conception of democracy is undermined. But, if he does not commit to the permanence of reasonable pluralism, then his rejection of Deweyan democracy is problematic. Since he chooses the latter interpretation, Talisse must bite the bullet and recognize that Peircean epistemic perfectionists cannot yet bid a definitive farewell to Deweyan democracy. Robert Talisse's A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy (2007a) has attracted a considerable amount of attention both from contemporary pragmatists who wish to defend the classical pragmatist tradition against his various polemical attacks, and from democratic theorists who are critical of his unique contribution to political philosophy ­ what Talisse refers to as a Peircean epistemic perfectionist conception of democracy.1 In this article, we show that there is a fundamental tension between Talisse's rejection of Deweyan democracy and his positive task of formulating a workable Peircean conception of democracy. The paper proceeds in the following manner. First, http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Contemporary Pragmatism Brill

Can Peircean Epistemic Perfectionists Bid Farewell to Deweyan Democracy?

Contemporary Pragmatism , Volume 6 (2): 165 – Apr 21, 2009

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© Copyright 2009 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
1572-3429
eISSN
1875-8185
DOI
10.1163/18758185-90000121
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Contemporary Pragmatism Vol. 6, No. 2 (December 2009), 165­183 Editions Rodopi © 2009 There is a tension between Robert Talisse's rejection of Deweyan democracy and his project of formulating a workable Peircean conception of democracy. If he follows Rawls in taking reasonable pluralism to be a permanent condition, then his Peircean conception of democracy is undermined. But, if he does not commit to the permanence of reasonable pluralism, then his rejection of Deweyan democracy is problematic. Since he chooses the latter interpretation, Talisse must bite the bullet and recognize that Peircean epistemic perfectionists cannot yet bid a definitive farewell to Deweyan democracy. Robert Talisse's A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy (2007a) has attracted a considerable amount of attention both from contemporary pragmatists who wish to defend the classical pragmatist tradition against his various polemical attacks, and from democratic theorists who are critical of his unique contribution to political philosophy ­ what Talisse refers to as a Peircean epistemic perfectionist conception of democracy.1 In this article, we show that there is a fundamental tension between Talisse's rejection of Deweyan democracy and his positive task of formulating a workable Peircean conception of democracy. The paper proceeds in the following manner. First,

Journal

Contemporary PragmatismBrill

Published: Apr 21, 2009

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