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Betting on Oil: The World Bank’s Attempt to Promote Accountability in Chad

Betting on Oil: The World Bank’s Attempt to Promote Accountability in Chad Global Governance 17 (2011), 229–245 Betting on Oil: The World Bank’s Attempt to Promote Accountability in Chad Matthew S. Winters and John A. Gould Can international donors ensure that poor countries spend their natural resource revenues on development? This article reviews the Chad- Cameroon Oil Pipeline Project and the World Bank’s fourteen-year effort to foster pro-poor expenditure of resource revenues in Chad. The World Bank used its leverage as a gatekeeper of private sector oil investment to write fiscal restrictions and extragovernmental oversight into Chadian law. These efforts, however, were not sufficient to overcome the country’s poor governance and weak political accountability. The article argues that ex- ternal donor efforts to build better governance in undemocratic states are unlikely to overcome resource curse and obsolescing bargain dynamics. They may even do more harm than good. The article recommends that the World Bank implement the 2003 Extractive Industry Review suggestion to cease investing in oil production. If the Bank does continue to lend to countries like Chad, it must ensure that it retains leverage across the life of the project in order to achieve its goals. KEYWORDS: Africa, Chad, gover- nance, resource curse, World Bank. ON 9 SEPTEMBER 2008, THE http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations Brill

Betting on Oil: The World Bank’s Attempt to Promote Accountability in Chad

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
Copyright © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
1075-2846
eISSN
1942-6720
DOI
10.1163/19426720-01702009
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Global Governance 17 (2011), 229–245 Betting on Oil: The World Bank’s Attempt to Promote Accountability in Chad Matthew S. Winters and John A. Gould Can international donors ensure that poor countries spend their natural resource revenues on development? This article reviews the Chad- Cameroon Oil Pipeline Project and the World Bank’s fourteen-year effort to foster pro-poor expenditure of resource revenues in Chad. The World Bank used its leverage as a gatekeeper of private sector oil investment to write fiscal restrictions and extragovernmental oversight into Chadian law. These efforts, however, were not sufficient to overcome the country’s poor governance and weak political accountability. The article argues that ex- ternal donor efforts to build better governance in undemocratic states are unlikely to overcome resource curse and obsolescing bargain dynamics. They may even do more harm than good. The article recommends that the World Bank implement the 2003 Extractive Industry Review suggestion to cease investing in oil production. If the Bank does continue to lend to countries like Chad, it must ensure that it retains leverage across the life of the project in order to achieve its goals. KEYWORDS: Africa, Chad, gover- nance, resource curse, World Bank. ON 9 SEPTEMBER 2008, THE

Journal

Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International OrganizationsBrill

Published: Aug 12, 2011

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