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Aron Gurwitsch's Non-Egological Conception of Consciousness

Aron Gurwitsch's Non-Egological Conception of Consciousness 43 Aron Gurwitsch's Non-Egological Conception of Consciousness ALEXANDRE METRAUX Aron Gurwitsch published "A Non-Egological Conception of Con- sciousness" in 1941.' This essay should be understood in continuity with his dissertation Phenomenology of Thematics and of the Pure Ego of 1929,2 and his (as yet unpublished) Die mitmenschlichen Begegnungen in der Milieuwelt of 1931.3 The development of Gurwitsch's thinking within this general framework went from an incomplete and dualistic to a more rigorous and unitary doctrine of consciousness.4 Let us see what this development is, and then examine some of its philosophic implications. The position one takes with respect to the problem of the ego is relevant not only for epistemology, but also for some rather important issues in social philosophy. Every statement meant to express an objective A word on the queer genealogy of this paper: the text was written originally in French, then criticized and translated by L. Embree, afterwards enlarged and revised by myself in not too clear English, and ultimately re-Englished by R. Carter. To both friends I am deeply indebted. ' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 1 (September 1940/June 1941); reprinted in Gurwitsch, Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology (cited hereafter as Studies), Evanston: 1966, http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Research in Phenomenology Brill

Aron Gurwitsch's Non-Egological Conception of Consciousness

Research in Phenomenology , Volume 5 (1): 43 – Jan 1, 1975

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
© 1975 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
0085-5553
eISSN
1569-1640
DOI
10.1163/156916475X00079
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

43 Aron Gurwitsch's Non-Egological Conception of Consciousness ALEXANDRE METRAUX Aron Gurwitsch published "A Non-Egological Conception of Con- sciousness" in 1941.' This essay should be understood in continuity with his dissertation Phenomenology of Thematics and of the Pure Ego of 1929,2 and his (as yet unpublished) Die mitmenschlichen Begegnungen in der Milieuwelt of 1931.3 The development of Gurwitsch's thinking within this general framework went from an incomplete and dualistic to a more rigorous and unitary doctrine of consciousness.4 Let us see what this development is, and then examine some of its philosophic implications. The position one takes with respect to the problem of the ego is relevant not only for epistemology, but also for some rather important issues in social philosophy. Every statement meant to express an objective A word on the queer genealogy of this paper: the text was written originally in French, then criticized and translated by L. Embree, afterwards enlarged and revised by myself in not too clear English, and ultimately re-Englished by R. Carter. To both friends I am deeply indebted. ' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 1 (September 1940/June 1941); reprinted in Gurwitsch, Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology (cited hereafter as Studies), Evanston: 1966,

Journal

Research in PhenomenologyBrill

Published: Jan 1, 1975

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