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Aristotle on the Irreducible Senses of the Good

Aristotle on the Irreducible Senses of the Good Aristotle on the Irreducible Senses of the Good Jurgis Brakas, Marist College, Poughkeepsie 1. Introduction There is a passage in the Nicomachean Ethics (NE) that holds out the promise of giving us a profound insight into Aristotle’s view of the good, A6: 1096a23– 29. Unfortunately, the passage – where Aristotle argues, contra Plato, that the good cannot be one thing – has proven remarkably resistant to satisfactory interpretation, defying the efforts of scholars over the last nine decades or so. According to Ross, it should be translated as follows: Since “good” has as many senses as “being” (for it is predicated both in the category of substance, as of God and of reason, and in quality, i.e. of the virtues, and in quantity, i.e. of that which is moderate, and in relation, i.e. of the useful, and in time, i.e. of the right opportunity, and in place, i.e. of the right locality and the like), clearly it cannot be something universally present in all cases and single; for then it could not have been predicated in all the categories but in one only. Íti d+ ‚pe» tÇgaj‰n  saq¿c lËgetai tƒ Ónti (ka» gÄr ‚n tƒ t– lËgetai, oŸon  http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis Brill

Aristotle on the Irreducible Senses of the Good

History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis , Volume 6 (1): 52 – Apr 5, 2003

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Publisher
Brill
Copyright
Copyright © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
2666-4283
eISSN
2666-4275
DOI
10.30965/26664275-00601004
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Abstract

Aristotle on the Irreducible Senses of the Good Jurgis Brakas, Marist College, Poughkeepsie 1. Introduction There is a passage in the Nicomachean Ethics (NE) that holds out the promise of giving us a profound insight into Aristotle’s view of the good, A6: 1096a23– 29. Unfortunately, the passage – where Aristotle argues, contra Plato, that the good cannot be one thing – has proven remarkably resistant to satisfactory interpretation, defying the efforts of scholars over the last nine decades or so. According to Ross, it should be translated as follows: Since “good” has as many senses as “being” (for it is predicated both in the category of substance, as of God and of reason, and in quality, i.e. of the virtues, and in quantity, i.e. of that which is moderate, and in relation, i.e. of the useful, and in time, i.e. of the right opportunity, and in place, i.e. of the right locality and the like), clearly it cannot be something universally present in all cases and single; for then it could not have been predicated in all the categories but in one only. Íti d+ ‚pe» tÇgaj‰n  saq¿c lËgetai tƒ Ónti (ka» gÄr ‚n tƒ t– lËgetai, oŸon Â

Journal

History of Philosophy and Logical AnalysisBrill

Published: Apr 5, 2003

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