Loading next page...
/lp/brill/analysis-explication-and-the-nature-of-concepts-JUmDkN4aGw
- Publisher
- Brill
- Copyright
- Copyright © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
- ISSN
- 2666-4283
- eISSN
- 2666-4275
- DOI
- 10.30965/26664275-02201011
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
What does the way we clarify and revise concepts reveal about the nature of concepts? This paper investigates the ontological commitments of conceptual analysis and explication regarding their supposed subject matter – concepts. It demonstrates the benefits of a cognitivist account of concepts, according to which they are not items on which the subject operates cognitively, but rather ways in which the subject operates. The proposed view helps to handle alternating references to ‘concepts’ and ‘terms’ in instructions on analysis and explication. Furthermore, its virtue lies not in the capacity to render concepts ‘shareable’ but in its ontological parsimony.
Journal
History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis – Brill
Published: Apr 5, 2019