Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Abelard’s Rejection of the Tarski Biconditional

Abelard’s Rejection of the Tarski Biconditional Abelard’s Rejection of the Tarski Biconditional Kevin Guilfoy, University of Akron In his commentary on Aristotle’s Categories Peter Abelard seems to deny the truth of the Tarski biconditional. Abelard argues that the biconditional “A man exists” is true iff a man exists when considered in some ways, is false. In each of the corresponding condition- als the antecedent might be true and the consequent still be false. This passage is striking for several reasons, primarily because the scope of Abelard’s denial is unclear. In his initial statement of the argument the conclusion seems to be that the biconditional is false and we are unjustified in drawing any conclusions about what is the case in the world from the fact that a sentence is true. In this paper I argue that Abelard rejects only the necessity of the bi- conditional; he does not make the much stronger claim that the conditional inferences cannot be true. Abelard’s argument hinges on his distinction between two kinds of conditional inference, consequence of condition (secundum conditionem) which Abelard sometimes also calls “unqualified” (simpliciter), and consequence of accompaniment (secundum comitationem). When the Tarski biconditional is taken to be a consequence of condition, then each corresponding http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis Brill

Abelard’s Rejection of the Tarski Biconditional

History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis , Volume 5 (1): 16 – Apr 5, 2002

Loading next page...
 
/lp/brill/abelard-s-rejection-of-the-tarski-biconditional-i6oz70fRDd
Publisher
Brill
Copyright
Copyright © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
ISSN
2666-4283
eISSN
2666-4275
DOI
10.30965/26664275-00501009
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abelard’s Rejection of the Tarski Biconditional Kevin Guilfoy, University of Akron In his commentary on Aristotle’s Categories Peter Abelard seems to deny the truth of the Tarski biconditional. Abelard argues that the biconditional “A man exists” is true iff a man exists when considered in some ways, is false. In each of the corresponding condition- als the antecedent might be true and the consequent still be false. This passage is striking for several reasons, primarily because the scope of Abelard’s denial is unclear. In his initial statement of the argument the conclusion seems to be that the biconditional is false and we are unjustified in drawing any conclusions about what is the case in the world from the fact that a sentence is true. In this paper I argue that Abelard rejects only the necessity of the bi- conditional; he does not make the much stronger claim that the conditional inferences cannot be true. Abelard’s argument hinges on his distinction between two kinds of conditional inference, consequence of condition (secundum conditionem) which Abelard sometimes also calls “unqualified” (simpliciter), and consequence of accompaniment (secundum comitationem). When the Tarski biconditional is taken to be a consequence of condition, then each corresponding

Journal

History of Philosophy and Logical AnalysisBrill

Published: Apr 5, 2002

There are no references for this article.