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- Publisher
- Association for Computing Machinery
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2012 by ACM Inc.
- ISSN
- 1094-9224
- DOI
- 10.1145/2133375.2133378
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Veri ed Cryptographic Implementations for TLS ´ KARTHIKEYAN BHARGAVAN and CEDRIC FOURNET, Microsoft Research, Cambridge ˘ RICARDO CORIN and EUGEN ZALINESCU, Microsoft Research-INRIA Joint Centre, Orsay We narrow the gap between concrete implementations of cryptographic protocols and their veri ed models. We develop and verify a small functional implementation of the Transport Layer Security protocol (TLS 1.0). We make use of the same executable code for interoperability testing against mainstream implementations for automated symbolic cryptographic veri cation and automated computational cryptographic veri cation. We rely on a combination of recent tools and also develop a new tool for extracting computational models from executable code. We obtain strong security guarantees for TLS as used in typical deployments. Categories and Subject Descriptors: C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: ”Security and protection; C.2.2 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Network Protocols; D.2.4 [Software Engineering]: Software/Program Veri cation; F.3.1 [Logics and Meanings of Programs]: Specifying and Verifying and Reasoning about Programs General Terms: Security, Veri cation ACM Reference Format: Bhargavan, K., Fournet, C., Corin, R., and Zalinescu, E. 2012. Veri ed cryptographic implementations for ˘ TLS. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur. 15, 1, Article 3 (March 2012), 32 pages. DOI = 10.1145/2133375.2133378 http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2133375.2133378 1. VERIFYING PROTOCOLS AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATIONS
Journal
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) – Association for Computing Machinery
Published: Mar 1, 2012