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Truthful Mechanisms for Agents That Value Privacy

Truthful Mechanisms for Agents That Value Privacy Truthful Mechanisms for Agents That Value Privacy YILING CHEN and STEPHEN CHONG, Harvard University IAN A. KASH, Microsoft Research TAL MORAN, Efi Arazi School of Computer Science, IDC Herzliya SALIL VADHAN, Harvard University Recent work has constructed economic mechanisms that are both truthful and differentially private. In these mechanisms, privacy is treated separately from truthfulness; it is not incorporated in players' utility functions (and doing so has been shown to lead to nontruthfulness in some cases). In this work, we propose a new, general way of modeling privacy in players' utility functions. Specifically, we only assume that if an outcome o has the property that any report of player i would have led to o with approximately the same probability, then o has a small privacy cost to player i. We give three mechanisms that are truthful with respect to our modeling of privacy: for an election between two candidates, for a discrete version of the facility location problem, and for a general social choice problem with discrete utilities (via a VCG-like mechanism). As the number n of players increases, the social welfare achieved by our mechanisms approaches optimal (as a fraction of n). Categories and Subject Descriptors: http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation Association for Computing Machinery

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Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery
Copyright
Copyright © 2016 by ACM Inc.
ISSN
2167-8375
DOI
10.1145/2892555
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Truthful Mechanisms for Agents That Value Privacy YILING CHEN and STEPHEN CHONG, Harvard University IAN A. KASH, Microsoft Research TAL MORAN, Efi Arazi School of Computer Science, IDC Herzliya SALIL VADHAN, Harvard University Recent work has constructed economic mechanisms that are both truthful and differentially private. In these mechanisms, privacy is treated separately from truthfulness; it is not incorporated in players' utility functions (and doing so has been shown to lead to nontruthfulness in some cases). In this work, we propose a new, general way of modeling privacy in players' utility functions. Specifically, we only assume that if an outcome o has the property that any report of player i would have led to o with approximately the same probability, then o has a small privacy cost to player i. We give three mechanisms that are truthful with respect to our modeling of privacy: for an election between two candidates, for a discrete version of the facility location problem, and for a general social choice problem with discrete utilities (via a VCG-like mechanism). As the number n of players increases, the social welfare achieved by our mechanisms approaches optimal (as a fraction of n). Categories and Subject Descriptors:

Journal

ACM Transactions on Economics and ComputationAssociation for Computing Machinery

Published: Mar 18, 2016

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