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- Publisher
- Association for Computing Machinery
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2019 Authors
- ISSN
- 1551-9031
- eISSN
- 1551-9031
- DOI
- 10.1145/3331033.3331035
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
This is the fourth annual collection of profiles of the junior faculty job market candidates of the SIGecom community. The twenty five candidates for 2019 are listed alphabetically and indexed by research areas that define the interests of the community. The candidates can be contacted individually or via the moderated mailing list ecom-candidates2019@acm.org.
Journal
ACM SIGecom Exchanges – Association for Computing Machinery
Published: May 7, 2019