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Security applications: lessons of real-world deployment

Security applications: lessons of real-world deployment Security Applications: Lessons of Real-World Deployment JAMES PITA, HARISH BELLAMANE, MANISH JAIN, CHRIS KIEKINTVELD, JASON ´˜ TSAI, FERNANDO ORDONEZ, MILIND TAMBE University of Southern California, CA, USA 1. INTRODUCTION Game theory has played an important role in security decisions. Recent work using Stackelberg games [Fudenberg and Tirole 1991] to model security domains has been particularly in ‚uential [Basilico et al. 2009; Kiekintveld et al. 2009; Paruchuri et al. 2008; Pita et al. 2008; Pita et al. 2009]. In a Stackelberg game, a leader (in this case the defender) acts rst and commits to a randomized security policy. The follower (attacker) optimizes its reward considering the strategy chosen by the leader. These games are well-suited to representing the problem security forces face in allocating limited resources, such as o ƒcers, canine units, and checkpoints. In particular, the fact that the attacker is able to observe the policy re ‚ects the way real terrorist organizations plan attacks using extensive surveillance and long planning cycles. Stackelberg game models are not just theoretical models; they are at the heart of deployed decision-support software now in use by the Los Angeles World Airport (LAWA) police and the United States Federal Air Marshals Service http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png ACM SIGecom Exchanges Association for Computing Machinery

Security applications: lessons of real-world deployment

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Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery
Copyright
Copyright © 2009 by ACM Inc.
ISSN
1551-9031
DOI
10.1145/1980522.1980527
Publisher site
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Abstract

Security Applications: Lessons of Real-World Deployment JAMES PITA, HARISH BELLAMANE, MANISH JAIN, CHRIS KIEKINTVELD, JASON ´˜ TSAI, FERNANDO ORDONEZ, MILIND TAMBE University of Southern California, CA, USA 1. INTRODUCTION Game theory has played an important role in security decisions. Recent work using Stackelberg games [Fudenberg and Tirole 1991] to model security domains has been particularly in ‚uential [Basilico et al. 2009; Kiekintveld et al. 2009; Paruchuri et al. 2008; Pita et al. 2008; Pita et al. 2009]. In a Stackelberg game, a leader (in this case the defender) acts rst and commits to a randomized security policy. The follower (attacker) optimizes its reward considering the strategy chosen by the leader. These games are well-suited to representing the problem security forces face in allocating limited resources, such as o ƒcers, canine units, and checkpoints. In particular, the fact that the attacker is able to observe the policy re ‚ects the way real terrorist organizations plan attacks using extensive surveillance and long planning cycles. Stackelberg game models are not just theoretical models; they are at the heart of deployed decision-support software now in use by the Los Angeles World Airport (LAWA) police and the United States Federal Air Marshals Service

Journal

ACM SIGecom Exchanges – Association for Computing Machinery

Published: Dec 1, 2009

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