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Network improvement for equilibrium routing

Network improvement for equilibrium routing Network Improvement for Equilibrium Routing UMANG BHASKAR University of Waterloo and KATRINA LIGETT California Institute of Technology Routing games are frequently used to model the behavior of traffic in large networks, such as road networks. In transportation research, the problem of adding capacity to a road network in a cost-effective manner to minimize the total delay at equilibrium is known as the Network Design Problem, and has received considerable attention. However, prior to our work, little was known about guarantees for polynomial-time algorithms for this problem. We obtain tight approximation guarantees for general and series-parallel networks, and present a number of open questions for future work. Categories and Subject Descriptors: F.2.0 [General]: Analysis of Algorithms and Problem Complexity--Approximation Algorithms General Terms: Algorithms; Theory; Economics Additional Key Words and Phrases: Routing games, network design, Wardrop equilibrium 1. INTRODUCTION Routing games model network traffic in applications where users choose paths in the network to minimize their delay. The cost, or total delay, at equilibria in routing games is very well-studied: tight bounds are known on the price of anarchy, as well as in many cases on techniques to influence player strategies (e.g., tolls, Stackelberg strategies) to improve the total delay http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png ACM SIGecom Exchanges Association for Computing Machinery

Network improvement for equilibrium routing

Bhaskar, Umang; Ligett, Katrina
ACM SIGecom Exchanges , Volume 13 (2) – Jan 28, 2015
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Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery
Copyright
Copyright © 2015 by ACM Inc.
ISSN
1551-9031
DOI
10.1145/2728732.2728737
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Abstract

Network Improvement for Equilibrium Routing UMANG BHASKAR University of Waterloo and KATRINA LIGETT California Institute of Technology Routing games are frequently used to model the behavior of traffic in large networks, such as road networks. In transportation research, the problem of adding capacity to a road network in a cost-effective manner to minimize the total delay at equilibrium is known as the Network Design Problem, and has received considerable attention. However, prior to our work, little was known about guarantees for polynomial-time algorithms for this problem. We obtain tight approximation guarantees for general and series-parallel networks, and present a number of open questions for future work. Categories and Subject Descriptors: F.2.0 [General]: Analysis of Algorithms and Problem Complexity--Approximation Algorithms General Terms: Algorithms; Theory; Economics Additional Key Words and Phrases: Routing games, network design, Wardrop equilibrium 1. INTRODUCTION Routing games model network traffic in applications where users choose paths in the network to minimize their delay. The cost, or total delay, at equilibria in routing games is very well-studied: tight bounds are known on the price of anarchy, as well as in many cases on techniques to influence player strategies (e.g., tolls, Stackelberg strategies) to improve the total delay

Journal

ACM SIGecom Exchanges – Association for Computing Machinery

Published: Jan 28, 2015

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