Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Eliciting preferences of sponsored search advertisers: implications for mechanism design

Eliciting preferences of sponsored search advertisers: implications for mechanism design Eliciting Preferences of Sponsored Search Advertisers: Implications for Mechanism Design DENIS NEKIPELOV University of Virginia Sponsored search advertising attracts hundreds of thousands of advertisers, many with dozens or even thousands of campaigns, leading to tens of millions of distinct keyword bids. Advertiser objectives are heterogeneous. Some advertisers primarily focus on making immediate sales that are referred by clicks, while others want to promote their brand with a top-position placement. In this letter we demonstrate how one can use the empirical bidding data to recover the values of bidders in a sponsored search marketplace when the type of bidder preferences is known (i.e. whether a given bidder values clicks). We also show how one can use the history of bid changes for a given bidder to recover both the type of preferences for this bidder and the value at once. This methodology has direct implications for mechanism design making the case for combining the empirical work and auction design to avoid the optimization of the auction mechanism for the wrong preference type of the bidders. Categories and Subject Descriptors: J.4 [Social and Behavioral Sciences]: Economics General Terms: Economics, Market Design, Econometrics Additional Key Words and Phrases: Sponsored search advertising, http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png ACM SIGecom Exchanges Association for Computing Machinery

Eliciting preferences of sponsored search advertisers: implications for mechanism design

Nekipelov, Denis
ACM SIGecom Exchanges , Volume 13 (1) – Nov 25, 2014
Download PDF
5 pages

Loading next page...
 
/lp/association-for-computing-machinery/eliciting-preferences-of-sponsored-search-advertisers-implications-for-9PfdmE8Ibz

References

References for this paper are not available at this time. We will be adding them shortly, thank you for your patience.

Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery
Copyright
Copyright © 2014 by ACM Inc.
ISSN
1551-9031
DOI
10.1145/2692375.2692383
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Eliciting Preferences of Sponsored Search Advertisers: Implications for Mechanism Design DENIS NEKIPELOV University of Virginia Sponsored search advertising attracts hundreds of thousands of advertisers, many with dozens or even thousands of campaigns, leading to tens of millions of distinct keyword bids. Advertiser objectives are heterogeneous. Some advertisers primarily focus on making immediate sales that are referred by clicks, while others want to promote their brand with a top-position placement. In this letter we demonstrate how one can use the empirical bidding data to recover the values of bidders in a sponsored search marketplace when the type of bidder preferences is known (i.e. whether a given bidder values clicks). We also show how one can use the history of bid changes for a given bidder to recover both the type of preferences for this bidder and the value at once. This methodology has direct implications for mechanism design making the case for combining the empirical work and auction design to avoid the optimization of the auction mechanism for the wrong preference type of the bidders. Categories and Subject Descriptors: J.4 [Social and Behavioral Sciences]: Economics General Terms: Economics, Market Design, Econometrics Additional Key Words and Phrases: Sponsored search advertising,

Journal

ACM SIGecom Exchanges – Association for Computing Machinery

Published: Nov 25, 2014

There are no references for this article.