Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

A note on redundancy in encrypted messages

A note on redundancy in encrypted messages A Note on Redundanc y in Encrypted Message s Li Gong* University of Cambridge Computer Laborator y Cambridge CB2 3QG, England June 199 0 Abstract . In a cryptographic protocol, it is important for a recipient t o determine that a message has not been modified during transmission . This is normally achieved by providing redundancy in the message . Typically, a message is described in the literature as containing enough redundancy, no t enough redundancy, or no redundancy at all . This note shows that, because of the secrecy that comes with encryption, redundancy can be provided at two different levels . An example demonstrates that this distinction is useful in guarding against certain cryptographic attacks on weak keys . 1 Introductio n Redundancy of a message, usually defined in terms of information entropy , is the redundancy of the source that generates the message . Without such redundancy, one cannot determine if a message is genuine . In particular , to interpret an encrypted message, a recipient must be assured that he ha s used the correct key for decryption and the ciphertext has not been modifie d The author is currently with Odyssey Research Associates, http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review Association for Computing Machinery

A note on redundancy in encrypted messages

Gong, Li
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review , Volume 20 (5) – Oct 1, 1990
Download PDF
5 pages

Loading next page...
 
/lp/association-for-computing-machinery/a-note-on-redundancy-in-encrypted-messages-jnk0B1jRQB

References (7)

Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery
Copyright
Copyright © 1990 by ACM Inc.
ISSN
0146-4833
DOI
10.1145/381906.381918
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

A Note on Redundanc y in Encrypted Message s Li Gong* University of Cambridge Computer Laborator y Cambridge CB2 3QG, England June 199 0 Abstract . In a cryptographic protocol, it is important for a recipient t o determine that a message has not been modified during transmission . This is normally achieved by providing redundancy in the message . Typically, a message is described in the literature as containing enough redundancy, no t enough redundancy, or no redundancy at all . This note shows that, because of the secrecy that comes with encryption, redundancy can be provided at two different levels . An example demonstrates that this distinction is useful in guarding against certain cryptographic attacks on weak keys . 1 Introductio n Redundancy of a message, usually defined in terms of information entropy , is the redundancy of the source that generates the message . Without such redundancy, one cannot determine if a message is genuine . In particular , to interpret an encrypted message, a recipient must be assured that he ha s used the correct key for decryption and the ciphertext has not been modifie d The author is currently with Odyssey Research Associates,

Journal

ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review – Association for Computing Machinery

Published: Oct 1, 1990

There are no references for this article.