Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

On the psychology of prediction

On the psychology of prediction Considers that intuitive predictions follow a judgmental heuristic-representativeness. By this heuristic, people predict the outcome that appears most representative of the evidence. Consequently, intuitive predictions are insensitive to the reliability of the evidence or to the prior probability of the outcome, in violation of the logic of statistical prediction. The hypothesis that people predict by representativeness was supported in a series of studies with both naive and sophisticated university students (N = 871). The ranking of outcomes by likelihood coincided with the ranking by representativeness, and Ss erroneously predicted rare events and extreme values if these happened to be representative. The experience of unjustified confidence in predictions and the prevalence of fallacious intuitions concerning statistical regression are traced to the representativeness heuristic. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Psychological Review American Psychological Association

On the psychology of prediction

Psychological Review , Volume 80 (4): 15 – Jul 1, 1973

Loading next page...
 
/lp/american-psychological-association/on-the-psychology-of-prediction-FWz7wbjgk2

References

References for this paper are not available at this time. We will be adding them shortly, thank you for your patience.

Publisher
American Psychological Association
Copyright
Copyright © 1973 American Psychological Association
ISSN
0033-295x
eISSN
1939-1471
DOI
10.1037/h0034747
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Considers that intuitive predictions follow a judgmental heuristic-representativeness. By this heuristic, people predict the outcome that appears most representative of the evidence. Consequently, intuitive predictions are insensitive to the reliability of the evidence or to the prior probability of the outcome, in violation of the logic of statistical prediction. The hypothesis that people predict by representativeness was supported in a series of studies with both naive and sophisticated university students (N = 871). The ranking of outcomes by likelihood coincided with the ranking by representativeness, and Ss erroneously predicted rare events and extreme values if these happened to be representative. The experience of unjustified confidence in predictions and the prevalence of fallacious intuitions concerning statistical regression are traced to the representativeness heuristic.

Journal

Psychological ReviewAmerican Psychological Association

Published: Jul 1, 1973

There are no references for this article.