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Beyond discrete biases: Functional and dysfunctional aspects of judgmental heuristics

Beyond discrete biases: Functional and dysfunctional aspects of judgmental heuristics Although recent research has identified systematic dysfunctional consequences of judgmental heuristics, the conditions under which such heuristics can be valid have not been specified. In particular, whereas judgment is part of a continuous, interactive process that people use to cope with the environment, most judgment research has focused on discrete incidents. This has led to underestimating the importance of feedback in ongoing processes and the unquestioned acceptance of several assumptions implicit in the discrete, normative models used to evaluate judgmental performance. In the present paper, these issues are elaborated in considering the distinctions between discrete and continuous approaches to the study of judgment and choice. It is argued that several biases identified in discrete incidents result from heuristics that are functional in the more natural continuous environment. Thus, a discrete–continuous perspective is necessary in evaluating judgmental heuristics. Questions are raised concerning both the meaning and applicability of discrete, normative theories of judgment and choice. (136 ref) http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Psychological Bulletin American Psychological Association

Beyond discrete biases: Functional and dysfunctional aspects of judgmental heuristics

Hogarth, Robin M.
Psychological Bulletin , Volume 90 (2): 21 – Sep 1, 1981
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References (117)

Publisher
American Psychological Association
Copyright
Copyright © 1981 American Psychological Association
ISSN
0033-2909
eISSN
1939-1455
DOI
10.1037/0033-2909.90.2.197
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Although recent research has identified systematic dysfunctional consequences of judgmental heuristics, the conditions under which such heuristics can be valid have not been specified. In particular, whereas judgment is part of a continuous, interactive process that people use to cope with the environment, most judgment research has focused on discrete incidents. This has led to underestimating the importance of feedback in ongoing processes and the unquestioned acceptance of several assumptions implicit in the discrete, normative models used to evaluate judgmental performance. In the present paper, these issues are elaborated in considering the distinctions between discrete and continuous approaches to the study of judgment and choice. It is argued that several biases identified in discrete incidents result from heuristics that are functional in the more natural continuous environment. Thus, a discrete–continuous perspective is necessary in evaluating judgmental heuristics. Questions are raised concerning both the meaning and applicability of discrete, normative theories of judgment and choice. (136 ref)

Journal

Psychological Bulletin – American Psychological Association

Published: Sep 1, 1981

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