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Security of Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution Against General Attacks

Security of Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution Against General Attacks We prove the security of Gaussian continuous-variable quantum key distribution with coherent states against arbitrary attacks in the finite-size regime. In contrast to previously known proofs of principle (based on the de Finetti theorem), our result is applicable in the practically relevant finite-size regime. This is achieved using a novel proof approach, which exploits phase-space symmetries of the protocols as well as the postselection technique introduced by Christandl, Koenig, and Renner ( Phys. Rev. Lett. 102 , 020504 ( 2009 ) PRLTAO 0031-9007 ). http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Physical Review Letters American Physical Society (APS)

Security of Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution Against General Attacks

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References (11)

Publisher
American Physical Society (APS)
Copyright
© 2013 American Physical Society
ISSN
0031-9007
DOI
10.1103/PhysRevLett.110.030502
pmid
23373907
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

We prove the security of Gaussian continuous-variable quantum key distribution with coherent states against arbitrary attacks in the finite-size regime. In contrast to previously known proofs of principle (based on the de Finetti theorem), our result is applicable in the practically relevant finite-size regime. This is achieved using a novel proof approach, which exploits phase-space symmetries of the protocols as well as the postselection technique introduced by Christandl, Koenig, and Renner ( Phys. Rev. Lett. 102 , 020504 ( 2009 ) PRLTAO 0031-9007 ).

Journal

Physical Review LettersAmerican Physical Society (APS)

Published: Jan 18, 2013

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