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We extend the security analysis of continuous variable quantum-key-distribution protocols using a family of post selection schemes to account for arbitrary eavesdropping attacks. We show that the postselection protocol is equivalent to a virtual entanglement-based protocol including a distillation stage. We introduce a particular ‘Gaussian' post selection and demonstrate that the security can be calculated using only experimentally accessible quantities. Finally, we explicitly evaluate the performance for the case of a noisy Gaussian channel in the limit of unbounded key length and find improvements over all pre-existing continuous variable protocols in realistic regimes.
Physical Review A – American Physical Society (APS)
Published: Feb 21, 2013
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