The Use of Violence in Illegal Markets: Evidence from Mahogany Trade in the Brazilian Amazon†

The Use of Violence in Illegal Markets: Evidence from Mahogany Trade in the Brazilian Amazon† AbstractWe provide evidence on the effect of market illegality on violence. Brazil was historically the main exporter of mahogany. Starting in the 1990s, trade was restricted and eventually prohibited. We build on previous evidence that mahogany trade persisted after prohibition and document relative increases in violence in areas with natural occurrence of mahogany. We show that as illegal activity receded in the late 2000s so did the relative increase in violence. We describe an experience of increase in violence following the transition of a market from legal to illegal and contribute to the evaluation of prohibition policies under limited enforcement. (JEL F14, K42, L73, O13, O17, O19, Q23) http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Economic Journal: Applied Economics American Economic Association

The Use of Violence in Illegal Markets: Evidence from Mahogany Trade in the Brazilian Amazon†

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Publisher
American Economic Association
Copyright
Copyright © 2017 © American Economic Association
ISSN
1945-7790
D.O.I.
10.1257/app.20160055
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

AbstractWe provide evidence on the effect of market illegality on violence. Brazil was historically the main exporter of mahogany. Starting in the 1990s, trade was restricted and eventually prohibited. We build on previous evidence that mahogany trade persisted after prohibition and document relative increases in violence in areas with natural occurrence of mahogany. We show that as illegal activity receded in the late 2000s so did the relative increase in violence. We describe an experience of increase in violence following the transition of a market from legal to illegal and contribute to the evaluation of prohibition policies under limited enforcement. (JEL F14, K42, L73, O13, O17, O19, Q23)

Journal

American Economic Journal: Applied EconomicsAmerican Economic Association

Published: Oct 1, 2017

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