An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects: Reply†

An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects: Reply† AbstractIn a comment, Okamoto (2018 ) identifies and corrects a misspecification of the rationing rule in Ausubel (2004 ). This reply elaborates on the observation that the optimality of truthful bidding in dynamic auctions may be sensitive to the fine details of the rationing rule. It then discusses the wider role of sequential bid processing in restoring truthful bidding. (JEL D44) http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Economic Review American Economic Association

An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects: Reply†

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Publisher
American Economic Association
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 © American Economic Association
ISSN
0002-8282
D.O.I.
10.1257/aer.20171408
Publisher site
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Abstract

AbstractIn a comment, Okamoto (2018 ) identifies and corrects a misspecification of the rationing rule in Ausubel (2004 ). This reply elaborates on the observation that the optimality of truthful bidding in dynamic auctions may be sensitive to the fine details of the rationing rule. It then discusses the wider role of sequential bid processing in restoring truthful bidding. (JEL D44)

Journal

American Economic ReviewAmerican Economic Association

Published: Feb 1, 2018

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