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WHY MUST THERE BE SOMETHING (OR ANYTHING) AT ALL? WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHY, AND RELIGIOUS BELIEF

WHY MUST THERE BE SOMETHING (OR ANYTHING) AT ALL? WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHY, AND RELIGIOUS BELIEF Given the context of the above quotation and his overall writings, it is clear that Wittgenstein was genuinely puzzled over religious beliefs. He neither claimed to be a religious believer nor an opponent. He was uncertain what to make of either position. What would it mean to say that one knew “how God should act”? How would this claim enter, if at all, into a person’s reasons for adopting religious belief, and would it be sufficient to make one change one’s direction in life? Do religious beliefs present their own set of legitimate problems on an entirely different plane from non-religious beliefs, and, if so, what sort of criteria is at stake? Such questions lie at the heart of Wittgenstein’s investigation of religious belief. He stated: “I am not a religious man but I cannot help seeing every problem from a religious point of view.” In this paper, the author contends that Wittgenstein should be viewed as a deeply religious thinker in methodological approach and fervor, rather than considered religious as a result of subscribing to doctrinally held beliefs. The author will explore this thesis by examining Wittgenstein’s critical pathways of thought in the Lectures on Religious Belief. Keywords: religious belief, tacit presupposition, explicated grammar, language game, evidence http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Review of Contemporary Philosophy Addleton Academic Publishers

WHY MUST THERE BE SOMETHING (OR ANYTHING) AT ALL? WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHY, AND RELIGIOUS BELIEF

ROBERT J. PARMACH
Review of Contemporary Philosophy , Volume 10 (1): 111-124 – Jan 1, 2012
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Addleton Academic Publishers
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© 2009 Addleton Academic Publishers
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1841-5261
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Abstract

Given the context of the above quotation and his overall writings, it is clear that Wittgenstein was genuinely puzzled over religious beliefs. He neither claimed to be a religious believer nor an opponent. He was uncertain what to make of either position. What would it mean to say that one knew “how God should act”? How would this claim enter, if at all, into a person’s reasons for adopting religious belief, and would it be sufficient to make one change one’s direction in life? Do religious beliefs present their own set of legitimate problems on an entirely different plane from non-religious beliefs, and, if so, what sort of criteria is at stake? Such questions lie at the heart of Wittgenstein’s investigation of religious belief. He stated: “I am not a religious man but I cannot help seeing every problem from a religious point of view.” In this paper, the author contends that Wittgenstein should be viewed as a deeply religious thinker in methodological approach and fervor, rather than considered religious as a result of subscribing to doctrinally held beliefs. The author will explore this thesis by examining Wittgenstein’s critical pathways of thought in the Lectures on Religious Belief. Keywords: religious belief, tacit presupposition, explicated grammar, language game, evidence

Journal

Review of Contemporary Philosophy – Addleton Academic Publishers

Published: Jan 1, 2012

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