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THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CORPORATE CRIME LEGISLATION

THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CORPORATE CRIME LEGISLATION Hamdani and Klement demonstrate that civil penalties or the pervasiveness standard could discourage wrongdoing more effectively than the threat of going out of business under the existing regime of entity liability. According to Richardson, a serious governance gap currently exists in the extraterritorial operations of corporations, rendering them unaccountable for grave violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. As Khanna puts it, corporations would prefer corporate crime legislation because its enforcement is less frequent and its penalties are normally lower than those associated with increases in corporate civil liability. Mullin and Snyder discuss securities fraud, a violation of a public corporation’s duty to report mandated financial information that has been audited according to accepted accounting principles. JEL: H83, K14, M14 http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Economics, Management, and Financial Markets Addleton Academic Publishers

THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CORPORATE CRIME LEGISLATION

LUMINITA IONESCU
Economics, Management, and Financial Markets , Volume 4 (3): 196-200 – Jan 1, 2010
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Publisher
Addleton Academic Publishers
Copyright
© 2009 Addleton Academic Publishers
ISSN
1842-3191
eISSN
1938-212X
Publisher site
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Abstract

Hamdani and Klement demonstrate that civil penalties or the pervasiveness standard could discourage wrongdoing more effectively than the threat of going out of business under the existing regime of entity liability. According to Richardson, a serious governance gap currently exists in the extraterritorial operations of corporations, rendering them unaccountable for grave violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. As Khanna puts it, corporations would prefer corporate crime legislation because its enforcement is less frequent and its penalties are normally lower than those associated with increases in corporate civil liability. Mullin and Snyder discuss securities fraud, a violation of a public corporation’s duty to report mandated financial information that has been audited according to accepted accounting principles. JEL: H83, K14, M14

Journal

Economics, Management, and Financial Markets – Addleton Academic Publishers

Published: Jan 1, 2010

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