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Joseph Salerno has attempted to provide an account of how anti-realist views concerning the nature of truth motivate intuitionistic revisions of logic. I will show that Salerno’s motivations can succeed granting the principles of inference that he assumes, but that further and more epistemically immodest presuppositions will be required. It is doubtful if a case resting upon these added presuppositions can succeed. Keywords: Salerno, antirealism, intuitionism, logical revisionism, Fitch, knowability
Review of Contemporary Philosophy – Addleton Academic Publishers
Published: Jan 1, 2010
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