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RYLE ON THE NOTION OF MEANING

RYLE ON THE NOTION OF MEANING In the present paper, I focus on Ryle’s understanding of the selfintimating theory of consciousness, his attempt to debunk skepticism, and his conceptual analysis of “mind.” Ryle holds that trueness and falseness, and correctness and incorrectness must be qualities or properties resident in the propositions which they characterize: the trueness or correctness of predictions and guesses must be features or properties which belong all the time to their possessors. There are infinitely many cases of one truth making necessary the truth of another proposition. Keywords: Ryle, logical behaviorism, self-intimating theory of consciousness http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Review of Contemporary Philosophy Addleton Academic Publishers

RYLE ON THE NOTION OF MEANING

Review of Contemporary Philosophy , Volume 11 (1): 6 – Jan 1, 2012

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Publisher
Addleton Academic Publishers
Copyright
© 2009 Addleton Academic Publishers
ISSN
1841-5261
eISSN
2471-089X
Publisher site
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Abstract

In the present paper, I focus on Ryle’s understanding of the selfintimating theory of consciousness, his attempt to debunk skepticism, and his conceptual analysis of “mind.” Ryle holds that trueness and falseness, and correctness and incorrectness must be qualities or properties resident in the propositions which they characterize: the trueness or correctness of predictions and guesses must be features or properties which belong all the time to their possessors. There are infinitely many cases of one truth making necessary the truth of another proposition. Keywords: Ryle, logical behaviorism, self-intimating theory of consciousness

Journal

Review of Contemporary PhilosophyAddleton Academic Publishers

Published: Jan 1, 2012

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