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ON NECESSARY BUT EXTERNAL RELATIONS

ON NECESSARY BUT EXTERNAL RELATIONS Here, I argue that the fundamental dogma that all necessary relations are internal is ungrounded. To motivate my argument, I analyze Moore’s classic ideas on internal relations and take them as an illustration of the common form of reasoning that can mislead us to conclude that all necessary relations are internal. That reasoning illicitly smuggles the idea that necessary properties and relations reflect on identity—in the sense that the loss of a necessary property/relation is a loss of identity—into the separate idea that the loss of a necessary property/relation is a loss of essence. Essence, however, is not identity. So the way seems to be open for the existence of necessary properties/relations which do not belong to the essence of entities; that is, the existence of necessary but external relations. I then offer some examples of such relations. Keywords: necessary relations, external relations, identity, essence, Moore http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Review of Contemporary Philosophy Addleton Academic Publishers

ON NECESSARY BUT EXTERNAL RELATIONS

M.J. GARCÍA-ENCINAS
Review of Contemporary Philosophy , Volume 12 (1): 9 – Jan 1, 2013
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Addleton Academic Publishers
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© 2009 Addleton Academic Publishers
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1841-5261
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2471-089X
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Abstract

Here, I argue that the fundamental dogma that all necessary relations are internal is ungrounded. To motivate my argument, I analyze Moore’s classic ideas on internal relations and take them as an illustration of the common form of reasoning that can mislead us to conclude that all necessary relations are internal. That reasoning illicitly smuggles the idea that necessary properties and relations reflect on identity—in the sense that the loss of a necessary property/relation is a loss of identity—into the separate idea that the loss of a necessary property/relation is a loss of essence. Essence, however, is not identity. So the way seems to be open for the existence of necessary properties/relations which do not belong to the essence of entities; that is, the existence of necessary but external relations. I then offer some examples of such relations. Keywords: necessary relations, external relations, identity, essence, Moore

Journal

Review of Contemporary Philosophy – Addleton Academic Publishers

Published: Jan 1, 2013

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