# MENTAL TYPES: THE BASIC ARGUMENTS

MENTAL TYPES: THE BASIC ARGUMENTS The central argument for nonreductive physicalism is the argument from multiple realizability. J. Kim subjected this argument to a forceful critique and defended a form of type-physicalism. I revisit these fundamental arguments here, reconstructing both the argument and the counterargument. I argue that not only does nonreductive physicalism escape Kim’s counterargument, but also its truth is central to our understanding of the physical world. Mental types are in general not reducible to physical types, and furthermore many important types of physical individuals can only be classified and explained by their role in realizing mental types. Keywords: non-reductive physicalism, type-physicalism, mental types, physical types, multiple realizability, wildly heterogeneous disjunctions http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Review of Contemporary Philosophy Addleton Academic Publishers

# MENTAL TYPES: THE BASIC ARGUMENTS

, Volume 12 (1): 19 – Jan 1, 2013
19 pages

Publisher
ISSN
1841-5261
eISSN
2471-089X
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

### Abstract

The central argument for nonreductive physicalism is the argument from multiple realizability. J. Kim subjected this argument to a forceful critique and defended a form of type-physicalism. I revisit these fundamental arguments here, reconstructing both the argument and the counterargument. I argue that not only does nonreductive physicalism escape Kim’s counterargument, but also its truth is central to our understanding of the physical world. Mental types are in general not reducible to physical types, and furthermore many important types of physical individuals can only be classified and explained by their role in realizing mental types. Keywords: non-reductive physicalism, type-physicalism, mental types, physical types, multiple realizability, wildly heterogeneous disjunctions