Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Loading next page...
/lp/addleton-academic-publishers/mental-types-the-basic-arguments-TTNxgEjNIJ
- Publisher
- Addleton Academic Publishers
- Copyright
- © 2009 Addleton Academic Publishers
- ISSN
- 1841-5261
- eISSN
- 2471-089X
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
The central argument for nonreductive physicalism is the argument from multiple realizability. J. Kim subjected this argument to a forceful critique and defended a form of type-physicalism. I revisit these fundamental arguments here, reconstructing both the argument and the counterargument. I argue that not only does nonreductive physicalism escape Kim’s counterargument, but also its truth is central to our understanding of the physical world. Mental types are in general not reducible to physical types, and furthermore many important types of physical individuals can only be classified and explained by their role in realizing mental types. Keywords: non-reductive physicalism, type-physicalism, mental types, physical types, multiple realizability, wildly heterogeneous disjunctions
Journal
Review of Contemporary Philosophy – Addleton Academic Publishers
Published: Jan 1, 2013