TY - JOUR
AU1 - Olson, Bradley
AU2 - Parayitam, Satyanarayana
AU3 - Skousen, Bradley
AU4 - Skousen, Christopher
AB - PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine the relationships between CEO ownership, stock option compensation, and risk taking. The authors include important CEO power variables as moderators.Design/methodology/approachThe paper uses a longitudinal regression analysis. In addition, the paper includes interactional plots for further interpretation.FindingsThe results indicate that CEO ownership reduces risk taking, while there is a partial support that stock options increase risk taking. CEO tenure is a powerful moderator that decreases risk taking in both CEO ownership and CEO stock option scenarios. Board independence, counter to the hypothesis in this paper, may encourage risk taking.Research limitations/implicationsThe findings in this paper provide support for the inclusion of CEO power variables in CEO compensation studies. However, the study examines large publicly traded companies; thus, all findings may not be applicable to small- and medium-sized companies.Originality/valueScholars have encouraged more complex CEO compensation models and the authors have examined both main effect and interaction models.
TI - How to strike a balance between CEO compensation and strategic risk? A longitudinal analysis
JF - Journal of Strategy and Management
DO - 10.1108/JSMA-08-2017-0055
DA - 2018-08-20
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/emerald-publishing/how-to-strike-a-balance-between-ceo-compensation-and-strategic-risk-a-gJj9ZQezFb
SP - 387
EP - 417
VL - 11
IS - 3
DP - DeepDyve