TY - JOUR
AU1 - Pedersen, Nikolaj Jang Linding
AB - Abstract Crispin Wright has recently introduced a non-evidential notion of warrant, entitlement of cognitive project, as a promising response to certain sceptical arguments that purport to show that we cannot claim any warrant for a wide range of beliefs that we ordinarily take ourselves to possess a warrant for. The basic idea is that, for a given class of cognitive projects, there are certain basic propositions – entitlements – which one is warranted in trusting provided there is no sufficient reason to think them false. Having presented Wright's notion of entitlement and rehearsed the sceptical arguments he invokes the notion to respond to, we proceed to raise what will be referred to as “the generality problem”. The problem raises the question whether entitlements come on the cheap. The good news delivered by entitlement is that it seems to deliver a way of resisting the sceptical conclusion. The bad news, however, is that it also appears to do much more than that by supporting, or providing a foundation for, what we would consider crazy and bizarre cognitive projects.
TI - Entitlements, good and bad
JF - SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy
DO - 10.1515/SATS.2006.58
DA - 2006-05-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/de-gruyter/entitlements-good-and-bad-Wmp0B0s2DG
SP - 58
VL - 7
IS - 1
DP - DeepDyve
ER -