TY - JOUR
AU - Maga, Timothy P.
AB - United States 1351 show flexibility over minor points, but never yielding Europe and Germany experts of the State Depart­ on major ones; plan to operate with surgical preci­ ment and the "globalists," drawn largely from the sion, but keep the bludgeon conveniently nearby" (p. East Coast academic elite, whom Kennedy brought with him to Washington. Rusk, who, according to 356). The more appropriate lesson, according to Thompson, might be the danger of pride and arro­ Schertz, "saw himself primarily as loyal supporter of gance, for in the end Khrushchev "beat" Kennedy in his president but, at the same time was close to his Cuba. The continuance of Castro today is proof of Europe experts, veered back and forth between these that. groups and, in the end, drew criticism from all sides" The fact is that no one "won" the missile crisis. And (p.462). perhaps its most pertinent lesson is that both sides It is indicative of the analytic confusion this pro­ could have avoided it. Fortunately, both sides exer­ duces that two of the most prominent examples of Schertz's "globalists" are a Nebraska lawyer (Theo­ cised caution in the end. Ironically, even though dore Sorensen, whose principal influence on 
TI - Thomas W. Zeiler. American Trade and Power in the 1960s. New York: Columbia University Press. 1992. Pp. xiv, 371. $45.00
JF - The American Historical Review
DO - 10.1086/ahr/98.4.1351-a
DA - 1993-10-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/thomas-w-zeiler-american-trade-and-power-in-the-1960s-new-york-zoAttFy1JO
SP - 1351
EP - 1352
VL - 98
IS - 4
DP - DeepDyve
ER -